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CITY OF BOERNE V. FLORES WRECKS RFRA:
SEARCHING FOR NUGGETS AMONG THE RUBBLE
John GatliffI
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on
government would be necessary. In framing a government which
is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in
this: You must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself.'
On March 9, 1998, Justice Antonin Scalia spoke to a leadership meeting
of the American Medical Association, explaining his philosophy of applying
the Constitution to controversial social issues! Scalia said, "It is not supposed
to be our judgment as to what is the socially desirable answer to all these
questions."3 Scalia went on to explain that the proper way to confront
twentieth century issues like abortion, the death penalty, and physician-
assisted suicide is through the legislative process, not through judicial revision
of the Constitution. "If you want a right... create it the way most rights are
created in a democracy: pass a law. If you don't want it, pass a law the other
way.1
4
Justice Scalia's AMA speech certainly was not his first profession of faith
in majoritarian processes. Scalia's AMA comments echoed his position in a
1997 zoning case, City of Boerne v. Flores.5 Scalia's concurrence in Boerne
defended the highly unpopular and criticized "peyote case" precedent with a
similar majoritarian paean: "The issue presented by [Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v.] Smithr] is, quite simply, whether the
people, through their elected representatives, or rather this Court, shall control
the outcome of those concrete cases. [l]t shall be the people."7 And
ultimately in Boerne, "the people," acting through a unanimous vote of the
Boerne, Texas, City Council, did decide. Five weeks after the city's victory
in the Supreme Court, the council agreed to allow St. Peter's Roman Catholic
*Associate Attorney, Self, Giddens and Lees, Inc., Oklahoma City, Okla. J.D., 1998,
University of Oklahoma College of Law; M.A.R.E., 1987, Southwestern Baptist Theological
Seminary; B.A. (Communication), 1982, University of Oklahoma.
1. THE FEDERALIsT No. 51, at 262 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
2. Glen Johnson, Associated Press, Justice: Let Congress Decide Laws (Mar. 9, 1998),
available in NEWSDAY.COM (visited Mar. 10, 1998) < httpl/www.newsday.comap/national.htm>.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
6. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
7. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2176 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Church to demolish twenty percent of a seventy-four-year-old sancthary,
clearing the way for a new church expansion project
But the irony of Boerne according to its critics, including the prolific
religious liberty writer Michael McConnell, is that "the people," acting
through the U.S. Congress, had already decided "The people" had decided
to reject Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,'"
which controversially held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment did not require a government to demonstrate a compelling interest
justification for facially neutral laws which incidentally burden religious
practices. Congress attempted to restore the compelling state interest test by
enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)." The
Boerne Court held that RFRA exceeded the scope of Congress' Fourteenth
Amendment power." This reinvigorated the much-maligned Smith precedent,
reducing to rubble both the Church's defense against a zoning law and "the
peoples' attempt to "create a right" through the federal legislative process.
Boerne is but the latest skirmish in a battle touched off by the Smith
decision. The battle involves fundamental questions of constitutional law, such
as federalism, separation of powers and the scope of First and Fourteenth
Amendments. The battle has raged though hundreds of law review pages,
courtrooms across America, statehouses and the halls of Congress. It has
involved a plethora of interest groups and unlikely coalitions. It began with
an often-ignored, indigenous ethnic subculture's free exercise claim of the
right to engage in spiritual enlightenment through a hallucinogenic, vomit-
inducing drug. Its latest round involved a virtually unanimous Congress
against the Court, the largest religious organization in the world against a
small, suburban community, and Justice Scalia's views on constitutional
interpretation against a brutal onslaught of academic and political criticism.
But at the center of the conflict is a simple question: Who should decide
whether, when and how to grant a religious exception to a facially neutral
law? Or, paraphrasing James Madison's words, who should decide when the
government would control the governed and how would it control itself on
questions of religious free exercise?
This comment will review the significant elements of the Boerne
controversy. First it will summarize how the Court built toward Smith, RFRA,
and ultimately Boerne, including how the Supreme Court eviscerated a
promising federal Indian law solution in route to the peyote decision. Second,
it will note important participants, events, and cases in the period between
8. City, Church End Dispute, DAILY OKLAHOMAN (Okla. City), Aug. 16, 1997, at 16.
9. Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: a Critique of City of Boerne v.
Flores, 111 IIHARv. L. REV. 153, 168 (1997) [hereinafter McConnell, Institutions].
10. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb (1994).
12. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2172.
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Smith and Boerne. Third, it will brief the Supreme Court opinions in Boerne.
Fourth it will analyze the effects of the Boerne decision, its impact on Indian
law, and proposed legislative remedies. Finally, it will attempt to predict
what, if anything, remains of RFRA after Boerne.
L Introduction: Why a Free Exercise Claim in a Simple Zoning Case?
Justice Kennedy needed only four brief paragraphs to describe the concrete
controversy at issue in Boerne."3 The litigants themselves were given to more
prolixity on the facts, 4 especially considering that Boerne ascended to the
highest court only as the technically necessary "actual case" vehicle for the
real main event: the RFRA showdown." The only essential fact was that a
private party sought an exception from a generally applicable, facially neutral
local ordinance under RFRA.' 6
The plaintiff, Archbishop P.F. Flores set the conflict in motion when he
consented to a parish plan to expand the buildings of the St. Peter Catholic
Church. The church needed to enlarge its facilities to accommodate a growing
number of parishioners in Boerne, a commuter community twenty-eight miles
northwest of San Antonio. 7 The church sanctuary could reasonably hold
13. Id. at 2160.
14. See Brief of Petitioner City of Boeme at *2-*9, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1996 WL
689630; Brief of Respondent Flores at *1-*2, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 10293; Brief for
the United States at *5-*9, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 13201.
15. The trial court certified the RFRA claim as an interlocutory appeal to the Fifth Circuit.
Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1985). The Fifth Circuit reversed the trial
court, holding that RFRA was constitutional. Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir.
1996). Thus Supreme Court granted certiorari on only the RFRA question. Boerne v. Flores, 117
S. Ct. 293 (1996).
16. RFRA provides that a person whose religious free exercise rights have been infringed
may "assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate
relief against a government." 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-(c) (1994), quoted in Brief for the United States
at *2, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 13201.
17. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2160. Generally, the San Antonio area has long been a Roman
Catholic stronghold. Franciscan missionary Father Antonio Olivares founded Mission San
Antonio de Valero on May 1, 1718. Four days later, the Spanish military established the Presidio
San Antonio de Bexar. This alignment of church and state was the basis for a city which became
an economic and cultural center in the Lower Rio Grande Valley during Spanish colonial times.
See Felix D. Almaraz, Jr., Spain's Cultural Legacy in Texas, in THE TEXAs HERITAGE 8 (Ben
Proctor & Archie P. McDonald eds., 2d ed. 1992). Boerne, however, was settled originally by
a German group known as the Free Thinkers. The city's name comes from anarchist poet, teacher
and Free Thinker Ludwig Boerne. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Free Thinkers marked
Boeme's outer border with a cautionary sign: "Ministers and Priests: Don't let sundown catch you
in this town." John W. Alexander, The Battle of Boerne, WORLD ON THE WEB, Jan. 11, 1997
(visited Mar. 6, 1998) <http://www.wordmag.com/world/issuelOl-11-97/national3.asp>. Father
Emil Fleury founded the mission which became St. Peter's across a creek from the Free Thinkers
settlement. The original Fleury-built mission was not involved in the zoning case and is adjacent
to the 1923 sanctuary. Id.
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
288 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23
about 230 worshipers, resulting in overflow crowds of forty to sixty at some
masses.18 The lack of space forced the church to begin celebrating mass in
an "ill-suited secular auditorium."' 9  Archbishop Flores authorized the
expansion to serve both these ever-growing crowds and the current liturgical
standards of the Catholic Church.'
While the Church's officials worked through the architectural planning
process, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance granting the local
Historic Landmark Commission authority to prepare a historic preservation
plan, including both historic landmarks and historic districts.2 The Church
agreed to the inclusion of the sanctuary's front facade in the new historic
district, but the remainder of the building and the site was outside the district
boundaries.'
The architect's plan, submitted to the city in order to obtain the necessary
demolition and construction permits, preserved only the facade of the original
sanctuary.n The Landmark Commission denied the Church's request,
reasoning that the substantial destruction of the original building would
adversely affect the new historic district. The city council denied the
Church's appeal.' The parties attempted to negotiate a settlement, but site
topography and the Landmark Commission's intractability on allowing any
changes to the existing building prevented agreement
18. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2160. The pastor's affidavit, cited in the respondent's brief, claimed
total church membership of 2170. Brief of Respondent Flores at *1, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997
WL 10293.
19. Brief of Respondent Flores at *I, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 10293.
20. Brief for the United States at *5, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 13201.
21. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2160.
22. Brief of Respondent Flores at *1, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 10293.
23. Id.
24. Brief of Petitioner City of Boerne at *5, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1996 WL 689630.
Whether the church building merited saving was at issue in the dispute. The aesthetic judgments
of the Catholic Church and the City agreed on very few points. The City described the building
as "a beautiful stone church, whose times and memories are graven into the souls of a city. [It
is] a stiiking example of mission revival architecture consciously referring back to the original
Spanish missions in South Texas." Id. at *1. In contrast, the Church's position was that the
building lacked historic value: "The church building is not an historic landmark, and in fact is
merely a modem imitation of a Spanish mission." Brief of Respondent Flores at * 1, Boerne (No.
95-2074), 1997 WL 10293. Furthermore, the Flores brief contended that the ordinance
unreasonably defined "historical" broadly to "'fool' its citizens," sweeping into regulatory reach
insignificant structures from as late as the 1950s. Id.
25. Brief of Petitioner City of Boerne at *6.
26. The Church is built on a "highly visible" location on a hill. Brief of Petitioner City of
Boerne at *2, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1996 WL 689630. The Church's brief claimed that the City
would have permitted construction on another part of the site "provided that [the Church]
perpetually maintains the old church building as a sort of architectural museum." Brief of
Respondent Flores at *2, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 10293. The Church's architect
estimated $500,000 in additional soil and site preparation costs to build on the City's proposed
location. Id. Following the Landmark Commission's recommendation, the City Council rejected
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol23/iss2/3
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Archbishop Flores then moved to challenge the historic preservation
ordinance and permit denials in court." Challenging historic landmark zoning
has become more difficult since Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York recognized its general validity under the police power. s But the
Landmark Commission's inflexibility combined with the inadequacy of any
alternative solution made the ordinance's effect arguably a taking and an
intrusion on the Church's religious use of the property.' RFRA also provided
the Church with a federal statutory weapon to challenge the zoning
ordinance.'
17. Building Toward Boerne: Conflicting Interpretations
of the Free Exercise Clause
A. The Traditional Design: The Compelling Interest Test
RFRA's roots are in the judicially created compelling interest test for
balancing free exercise claims.' Like most balancing tests, the free exercise
clause application of the compelling interest test developed through a series
of cases3 These cases show a transformation in the Court's Free Exercise
a settlement proposed by an architect jointly hired by the Church and the City. The renovation
proposal would have preserved seventy percent of the existing structure. Alexander, supra note
17, at 5.
27. Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1985); see supra note 15.
28. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883
(1978) (holding historic preservation zoning valid if in application the property owner is left with
a prospect of a reasonable rate of return on investment). See generally OsBoRNE M. REYNOLDs,
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 118, at 381-82 (1982 & Supp. 1996); Angela C. Carmella, Houses
of Worship and Religious Liberty: Constitutional Limits to Landmark Preservation and
Architectural Review, 36 VILL. L. REV. 401 (1991).
29. Flores' challenge to the ordinance included several state and federal constitutional claims,
including a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claim and a Free Exercise Clause claim. Because
the RFRA claim was heard on an interlocutory appeal, the other claims were not reached by the
Fifth Circuit or the Supreme Court. See Brief of Respondent Flores at *2, Boerne (No. 95-2074),
1997 WL 10293.
30. A RFRA claim, however, did not guarantee churches success against zoning laws. See,
e.g., Daytona Rescue Mission, Inc. v. City of Daytona Beach, 885 F. Supp. 1554 (M..D. Fla.
1995) (holding no substantial burden to free exercise because zoning only channeled conduct);
Keeler v. City of Cumberland, 928 F. Supp. 591 (D. Md. 1996) (holding RFRA an
unconstitutional violation of separation of powers doctrine); Germantown Seventh Day Adventist
Church v. City of Philadelphia, Civ. No. 94-1633, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12163 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(denial of permit for church addition under zoning code provision did not affect freedom of
religion). But see, e.g., Western Presbyterian Church v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 862 F.
Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1994) (finding that city had not demonstrated a compelling interest in denial
of zoning approval for homeless shelter as an accessory use to church); Jesus Center v.
Farmington Hills Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 544 N.W.2d 698 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (enjoining city
from enforcing zoning ordinance against feeding homeless).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (1994) (describing, in part, the case law basis for the
compelling interest test before Smith).
32. Most commentators include their own versions of how the test developed, often with a
No. 2]
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Cause reasoning, moving from a bright line belief-conduct distinction to an
analylical balancing and then partially retrenching to the bright line.
Generally, scholars note that courts heard few free exercise claims before
Reynolds v. United States, which introduced the belief-conduct distinction into
the Court's free exercise jurisprudence 3 In Reynolds, the Supreme Court
upheld a federal criminal law banning polygamy as applied to a Mormon.'
particular ideological perspective. See, e.g., JOHN EiDSMOE, THE CHRISTIAN LEGAL ADVISOR
156-64 (1984) (explaining the key cases for conservative lay audience); Daniel 0. Conkle, The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitutional Significance of an Unconstitutional
Statute, 56 MONT. L. REv. 39, 54-57 (1995) (emphasizing the Smith court's return to the Reynolds
belief-conduct distinction); Thomas J. Cunningham, Considering Religion as a Factor in Foster
Care in the Aftermath of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 28 U. RICH L. REV. 53, 60-62 (1994) (explaining that
Smith "salvaged" the test in hybrid rights foster care cases); Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA:
A Law er's Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 171, 176-78
(1995) [hereinafter Lupu, Lawyer's Guide] (concluding that RFRA's claim of restoration is both
prospective and retrospective, emphasizing the trend away from the test before Smith); Harry F.
Tepker, Hallucinations of Neutrality in the Oregon Peyote Case, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (1991)
[hereinafter Tepker, Hallucinations] (arguing that Scalia misused precedent in Smith, that the real
test is "close" scrutiny, and that the best unification theory for free exercise jurisprudence is a
right to religious privacy); John W. Whitehead, The Conservative Supreme Court and the Demise
of the Free Exercise of Religion, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTs. L. REV. 1 (1997) [hereinafter
Whitehead, Demise] (a comprehensive 139-page, 1078-footnote analysis of free exercise cases,
concluding that conflicting conservative and liberal challenges to the supremacy of the free
exercise clause have produced inconsistent results). Other significant scholarship on the
compelling interest test includes Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Free
Exercise Clause and Religious Diversity, 59 UMKC L. REV. 591 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The
Supreme Court's Assault on Free Exercise, and the Amicus Brief that Was Never Filed, 8 J.L. &
RELIGION 99 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision,
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism]; Michael W.
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV.
L. REv. 1409 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Origins]; Ellis M. West, The Case Against a Right
to Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 623 (1990).
33. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); see Lupu, Lawyer's Guide, supra note
32, at '176.
34. Id. The Mormons are formally known as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
Doctrinally, the Mormon religion's official name is somewhat misleading, in that Mormon
theology diverges significantly from orthodox denominational forms of Christianity. Mormon
apologists and some secular or secularized religion scholars operating at a higher level of
abstraction may argue against the implicit assumption that Mormonism is not merely a divergent
denomination within Christianity. Notwithstanding semanticist S.l. Hayakawa's sagacious
observation that definitions are only descriptive about how people use language, see S.l.
HAYAiAWA, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION 155-63 (3d ed. 1972) [hereinafter
LANGUAGE], any definition of the Christian faith reasonably based on generally held, orthodox
theological doctrines must exclude the LDS cult. Some scholars argue that terms such as cult,
sect, and denomination should be used interchangeably. See Cult, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIC
DICTIcNARY OF THE WESTERN CHURCHES 246-47 (T.C. O'Brien ed., 1970) [hereinafter
DICTICNARY OF WESTERN CHURCHES]. Other scholars argue that analytical precision is fostered
by meaningful, exclusive definitions based on the relative level of theological orthodoxy. See
e.g., Ronald M. Enroth, What Is a Cult, in A GUIDE TO CULTS AND NEw RELIGIONS 11-24
290 [VoL 23
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Although polygamy is an ancient tradition practiced in patriarchal cultures,
and enduring to modem times chiefly through the spread of Islam since A.D.
610, Christianity's doctrine of monogamous marriage banished polygamy from
Western law and practice." The Mormon religion, however, revived
polygamy as an arguably central tenet of their religious practice by the time
Reynolds was decided in 1878.
The centrality claim stems from Mormon epistemological and
eschatological contentions. The cult's founder, Joseph Smith claimed to have
received an uncorroborated visit from the angel Moroni on September 21,
1823. Moroni allegedly tipped Smith to a series of golden plates hidden on
a New York hillside containing the story of God's work among the ancient
indigenous Americans.' The golden plates, which unfortunately for scholars
were repossessed by Moroni after Smith finished translating them into
English, revealed the spectacular story of two elaborate, but lost civilizations
which existed on the North American continent' Smith was inspired to
(Ronald M. Enroth ed., 1983) [hereinafter A GUIDE TO CULTS]; EIDSMOE, supra note 32, at 326-
27; Irving Hexham, Cults, in EVANGELICAL DICTIONARY OF THEOLOGY 289 (Walter A. Elwell
ed., 1984) [hereinafter EVANGELICAL DIciONARY]. Systematic Teologian Anthony A. Hoekema
suggests nine factors which differentiate cults from churches or denominations: (1) Cults abruptly
break from historic Christian structures and confessions; (2) Cults build major doctrines around
insignificant points from the Bible; (3) Cults tend to view their members as having superior
holiness or advocate perfectionism; (4) Cults attach significant importance to extrascriptural
authority sources; (5) Cults elevate a person or persons to equal or similar importance to Jesus
Christ; (6) Cults reject traditional Trinitarian formulations of the Godhead; (7) Cults deny
orthodox views on justification by grace, substituting works or combination forms of salvation;
(8) Cults tend to claim that their group is the exclusive community of saved or redeemed persons;
(9) Cults believe that their group will have a central role in eschatology. EIDSMOE, supra note
32, at 326 (citing ANTHONY A. HOEKEMA, THE FOUR MAJOR CULTS 373-88 (1965)). Essential
Mormon doctrines place the religion squarely within Hoekema's factors. See infra notes 35-46.
The legal significance of this distinction may seem minimal, but if a court uses a Free Exercise
Clause balancing test which prompts a centrality or relative importance of belief analysis,
overinclusive majoritarian categorizations of a religion can minimize the importance of
unorthodox practices to a religion's essence. It would be far easier for a court to rationalize
dismissing a peripheral practice, as compared with the bulk of "Christian" practices, as not being
central to "Christian beliefs," than it would be to dismiss a unique practice of a distinct religion.
The Boerne majority feared that such centrality analyses were required by RFRA, unless the court
deferred to any objector's claim. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2171. The Ninth Circuit actually
adopted a centrality test in its RFRA jurisprudence. The harsh Ninth Circuit test required a
religious free exercise exemption claimant to show that the burdened practice was mandated by
the claimant's faith, was a central tenet or belief of religious doctrine and was substantially
interfered with by the law at issue. See e.g., Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995).
35. See J.T. Mueller, Polygamy, in EVANGELICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 861. See
generally David J. Hesselgrave, Polygamy, in BAKER'S DICrIONARY OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS 514-15
(Carl F.H. Henry ed., 1973).
36. Donald S. Tingle, Latter-day Saints (Mormons), in A GUIDE TO CULTS, supra note 34,
at 119 [hereinafter Tingle, LDS]. Conveniently, the plates supposedly came with special
translator's glasses, called Urim and Thummim, to assist the unlearned 17-year old Smith in
deciphering the text. Id.
37. Il The historicity and archaeological evidence (or lack of same) for the Book of
No. 2]
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found the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints on April 6, 1830, and
publish his translation of the golden plates as the Book of Mormon in the
same year?' Due in no small part to Smith's incredible claims that he
received revelations from God as a modem-day prophet and apostle, including
the announcement that all Christian sects were in complete apostasy, Smith's
group was not well-received in his home town of Palmyra, New York, Nor
was the group free from opposition at subsequent settlements in Kirkland,
Ohio and Jackson County, Missouri. 9 Smith's problems were compounded
by a July 12, 1843, revelation that he claimed to receive at the Mormon's new
Nauvoo, Illinois settlement. Smith determined that reviving Old Testament-
style polygamy was God's will for members in the "Holy Order" of church
leaders. This caused an intra-Mormon conflict, culminating with the arson of
an anti-Mormon newspaper allegedly committed by Joseph Smith and his
brother Hyram Smith. A mob murdered Joseph Smith during a shoot-out at
the Carthage, Illinois jail on June 7, 1844. Brigham Young regrouped and
removed the majority of Smith's followers in 1847 to the Great Salt Lake.
Young's group became the nucleus of Utah Territory, which was formed
through the Compromise of 1850.41 Although Utah Territory formally
outlawed polygamy, the controversy did not end with the Mormons'
relocation.
Smith's polygamy revelation remained part of Mormon doctrine and
practice at the time of Reynolds.42 Contrary to the Christian teaching that
Mormon is a highly contentious and technical field of study beyond the scope of this comment.
For the purposes of religious liberty analysis, the reader should assume that the unorthodox
beliefs of Mormons are "sincerely held." Interestingly from the Native American perspective,
Smith's revelation teaches that American Indians, known as the Lamanites, are said to be the
descendants of apostates from these groups, the Jardeites and the Nephites. The Lamanites were
supposedly cursed with dark skin for their apostasy. Irving Hexham, Mormonism, in
EVANGELICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 735-36 [hereinafter Hexham, Mormonism].
38. Hexham, Mormonism, supra note 37, at 735. Originally, Smith named his new group
"Church of Christ," but this should not be confused with the modem offshoot from the
Campbellite movement known as the Church of Christ. See Tingle, LDS, supra note 36, at 120.
39. Hexham, Mormonism, supra note 37, at 735.
40. lt; see also Tingle, LDS, supra note 36, at 121-22.
41. JOHN A. GARRATY, THE AMERICAN NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES TO
1877, at 322-24 (4th ed. 1979).
42. In addition to the Bible and the Book of Mormon, Smith left the Mormons with The
Pearl of Great Price (containing Smith's translations of portions of the Bible and two Egyptian
papyri which some modem non-Mormon scholars have determined to be Roman period portions
of the Egyptian Book of the Dead, not the "Book of Abraham" as Smith claimed) and The
Doctrines and Covenants (preserving a number of Smith's revelations, including the polygamy
teaching and a subsequent non-Smith revelation holding it to be unnecessary). See Tingle, LDS,
supra note 36, at 122-30. The reigning LDS prophet, known as the church's President, has the
authority to receive new revelations and to revise Mormon scriptures. Consequently, the
Mormons have amended their organic documents numerous times. Id.; see also Hexham,
Mormonism, supra note 37, at 736.
292 [Vol. 23
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marriage is a temporal institution,43 Mormonism teaches a unique form of
polytheism that includes "celestial marriage." The highest aspiration of an
obedient Mormon adherent is to have their marriage "eternally sealed" on
earth in a Mormon temple, meeting one of the requirements for progression
to godhood." For a believer in the Mormon system who is working his way
to the third and highest level of the afterlife, these earth-originated celestial
marriages are essential in that each god and his family will receive his own
planet to populate and rule! 5 Because spiritual procreation can only occur
through physical sexual union, a larger number of celestial wives facilitates
the planet population process. Thus, preventing a Mormon from having
multiple wives significantly compromised his eternal religious free exercise
rights."
The Reynolds Court recognized the unique place polygamy had in the
Utah/Mormon community. A number of jurors were excluded at the trial
court level because of their belief in the principle, not withstanding the federal
and Utah laws to the contrary' The Court also noted that the Mormon
Church taught polygamy as a duty for all male church members." However,
the Court did not allow a religious objector's exception to criminal laws
against "overt acts."'49 The Court reasoned that "Congress was deprived of
43. Matthew 22:30 (quoting Jesus) ("For in the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given
in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven.").
44. Hexham, Mormonism, supra note 37, at 736.
45. Dennis A. Wright, The Mormon View of Heaven, BAPTIST MESSENGER, Jan. 8, 1998, at
3.
46. Although the Mormon church has officially modified its doctrine to conform with current
matrimonial laws, an unknown number of fundamentalist Mormons remain committed to
practicing polygamy underground. For example, one vocal dissident Mormon group, the True
& Living Church of Jesus Christ of Saints of the Last Days, based in Manti, Utah, publishes the
following declaration:
We believe and live Plural Marriage because it is a commandment of God, and we
fear God more than man. In the 1800's the U.S. Government sought to legally
destroy all who believed in it, and eventually succeeded in causing the LDS
Church to compromise under the pressure. In today's society, however, we find
that the liberal government is far more permissive of non-traditional families. If
states can decide on the legality of homosexual marriage, then surely plural
marriage cannot be so intolerable. In living our beliefs, we do not break any
enforceable laws. We do not obtain marriage licenses for successive marriages, and
so are not guilty of bigamy. All parties are consenting adults and are fully aware
of the arrangement, so there is no charge of infedelity [sic] or adultery. The only
man-made law that is breached is that of "unlawful cohabitation", of which an
immense number of citizens of the U.S. and other countries who merely live
together and copulate are likewise guilty, thus rendering the law unenforceable.
Website of the True & Living Church of Jesus Christ of Saints of the Last Days (visited Mar. 21,
1998) <http:llwww.tlcmanti.orglFAQFolder/faqMain.html>.
47. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 157.
48. Id. at 161.
49. Id. at 167.
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all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions
which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order.""
Although the Reynolds belief-conduct distinction was abandoned in later First
Amendment cases, such as Cantwell v. Connecticut,"I Reynolds stands as the
landmark case establishing that the Free Exercise clause does not require
religious exemptions from facially neutral laws of general applicability. 2
The pivotal event in the Court's development of compelling interest
balancing test occurred in 1963, when the Court considered whether refusing
to accept a job because it would require working on the claimant's Sabbath
would disqualify the claimant for unemployment compensation. In Sherbert
v. Verner, the Court held that denial of benefits under these circumstances
burdened the free exercise of religion in excess of any compelling state
interest.' The Court continued to expand the scope of Sherbert's compelling
interest balancing test in subsequent unemployment compensation cases.'
The next milestone for the compelling interest test involved an Old Order
Amish plaintiff defying Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law, by
refusing to send his teenaged children to public school after the eighth
grade." In this 1972 case, Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court held that the state's
interest in universal education did not outweigh the deeply held Amish
religious beliefs that public high schools were too secularizing and that
informal, agricultural training better prepared their children for adulthood in
the Amish faith. Until RFRA attempted to codify the compelling interest
test balancing, Yoder was probably the zenith for weighing religious claims
against facially neutral laws of general applicability.
After Yoder, however, the Court used the compelling interest balancing test
to reject claims outside the Sherbert-line of unemployment cases. 7 The
50. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167.
51. 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding that the state cannot suppress communication of religious
views to preserve the public peace).
52. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990);
see also Whitehead, Demise, supra note 32, at 33-38 (discussing Reynolds and the "durability"
of the no religious exceptions rule in subsequent cases). But see Tepker, Hallucinations, supra
note 32, ,t 15-17 (arguing that Scalia overgeneralized an "overt acts" rule from a precedent that
should be limited to marriage).
53. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Sherbert and its progeny are extensively
discussed in Whitehead, Demise, supra note 32, at 87-90.
54. 5ee Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (extending
Sherbert -to cover claimant whose beliefs changed during employment); Frazee v. Illinois Dep't
of Employment Servs., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (extending Sherbert to a sabbath work objector who
was not a member of any particular sect).
55. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
56. Id. at 215.
57. See Lupu, Lawyer's Guide, supra note 32, at 178-80 (suggesting that "substantial burden"
threshold for the test functioned to exclude free exercise claims); Tepker, Hallucinations, supra
note 32, . 22-24 (explaining the narrowing trend foreshadowed Smith); see, e.g., Bowen v. Roy,
476 U.S. 693 (1986) (upholding statutory requirement that social security numbers be used in
[Vol. 23
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol23/iss2/3
BOERNE V. FLORES WRECKS RFRA
Court also distinguished many cases from the Sherbert-Yoder balancing line
of decisions.58 Several of these decisions, however, were corrected with
specific legislation." Consequently, portents of both judicial replacement of
the test and legislative reaction to remedy the subsequent effects were
apparent on the eve of Scalia's free exercise clause renovation in the "peyote
case."
B. Scalia Remodels: Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith
In the AMA speech, Justice Scalia commented that "[h]aving the
Constitution mean whatever five out of nine justices think it ought to mean
these days is not flexibility but rigidity."' Scalia's critics and his supporters
will perhaps draw different conclusions, but many will notice the irony of this
comment considering that he wrote one of the most controversial and arguably
inflexible five-four decisions of the past decade: Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith. Ira Lupu summed up the daunting
quantity and tedious redundancy of the academic commentary on Smith,
suggesting that "[c]riticizing Smith is no longer original or useful; we have all
become repetitive in our criticisms, and by now, our audiences are either
persuaded or turned off."6
administering welfare programs notwithstanding religious belief that use of the number would
impair the spirit).
58. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (deferring to air force regulation
prohibiting the wearing of yarmulkes under an unauthorized headgear regulation intended to
preserve uniformity); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)
(rejecting the applicability of the test because Indian religious claimants were not punished or
coerced by desecration of a sacred site on federal lands traditionally used for religious purposes);
O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (applying lesser "reasonableness" test to
prisoner free exercise claims); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (finding an overriding
national interest in preserving the Social Security system).
59. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1994) (responding to Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503
(1986)); 26 U.S.C. § 3127 (1988) (responding to United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), and
repealing the mandatory social security tax obligation as applied to objecting religious employers
and employees).
60. Johnson, supra note 2.
61. Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court Centrism,
1993 BYU L. REV. 259, 268 (1993) [hereinafter Lupu, Supreme Court Centrism] (emphasis
added). The literature on Smith is vast. In addition to the articles cited supra note 32, see, e.g.,
Stephen L. Carter, The Supreme Court, 1992 Term - Comment: The Resurrection of Religious
Freedom?, 107 HARV. L. REv. 118 (1993); John Delaney, Police Power Absolutism and
Nullifying the Free Exercise Clause: A Critique of Oregon v. Smith, 25 IND. L. REv. 71 (1991);
Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. Prrr. L. REv. 75 (1990); James D. Gordon
III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91 (1991); Uno A. Graglia, Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye: Of Animal Sacrifice and Religious Persecution, 85 GEO. L.J. 1, 20-23
(1996); David L. Gregory & Charles Russo, Let Us Pray (But Not 'Them!"): The Troubled
Jurisprudence of Religious Liberty, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 329 (1991); Philip A. Hamburger, A
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The facts in Smith may not have alarmed many non-Indians outside the
discrete and insular community of First Amendment scholars. Oregon's
criminal drug possession statute incorporated the federal definition of
controlled substances. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, Oregon had
neglected to follow the lead of over twenty states who had written an
exception for the ceremonial use of Lophophorawilliamsii Lemaire, a small
spineless cactus plant native to the southwestern states, known commonly as
peyote.' The drug, extracted from eating the tops, or buttons of the cacti,
produces mild hallucinations, depression, almost certain nausea, and
vomiting.' But in the syncretistic Native American Church, which blends
traditional indigenous ritual elements with Christianity, the drug functions
much like sacramental wine.6
Two drug counselors at a drug treatment program were members of the
Native American Church. Their ceremonial consumption of trace amounts of
peyote ran afoul of both the program's "no tolerance" policy and the poorly
drafted Oregon drug possession statute." The counselors were subsequently
fired after refusing lesser disciplinary action. They attempted to collect
unemployment compensation, but were ultimately denied. After a complex
procedural history that included an earlier trip to the Supreme Court, in which
the Court remanded the case back down to the Oregon court to determine
whether sacramental peyote use violated the state's drug laws, Smith returned
to the Court to resolve the free exercise claim. Oregon appealed the state
Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
915 (1992); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Cr. REv. 1; William
P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991);
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. Rv.
1109 (1990); John Rhodes, An American Tradition: The Religious Persecution of Native
Americans, 52 MONT. L. REv. 13 (1991); Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious
Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 231-37 (1991); Maximillian B.
Torres, Free Exercise of Religion: Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith, 14 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 282 (1991); Theresa Cook, Note, The Peyote Case: A Return
to Reynolds, 68 DENV. U. L. REv. 91 (1991); Maria Elise Lasso, Comment, Employment
Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court Improves the State of Free Exercise Doctrine, 12 ST.
Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 569 (1993); Robert 0. Lindefjeld, Note, The Smith Decision: A Legal
"Foray into the Realm of the Hypothetical," 2 WIDENER J. PUn. L. 219 (1992); see also
Cunningham, supra note 32, at 56 n.6 (containing an extensive listing of student comments and
notes on Smith).
62. Tepker, Hallucinations, supra note 32, at 2-3.
63. Lindefqeld, supra note 61, at 279 n.75; Ann E. Beeson, Comment, Dances With Justice:
Peyotism in the Courts, 41 EMORY L.J. 1121, 1129-30 (offering an extensive history of peyotism).
64. Beeson, supra note 63, at 1129-30.
65. Id. at 1134-35. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Smith extensively analyzes peyotism and
he develops the sacramental wine analogy. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v,
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 913 n.6 (1990).
66. Lindefield, supra note 61, at 230-36.
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supreme court's ruling that the free exercise clause entitled the claimants to
an exception to the facially neutral drug statute.67
Scalia's opinion for the four vote plurality was an unexpected retreat from
the Sherbert-Yoder line of balancing cases. Scalia, leery of balancing and
favoring a bright line rule,' impliedly resurrected the Reynolds belief-
conduct distinction. 6  Scalia knitted together a series of arguably
distinguishable cases to stand for the rule that the Free Exercise Clause does
not entitle anyone to an exception from a facially neutral law.7' Then, Scalia
reasoned that a second group of cases demonstrated Sherbert's lack of
viability outside the unemployment compensation niche.7 Finally, the
plurality opinion distinguished the Sherbert-Yoder line by finding that each of
these actually involved a hybrid claim, linking the free exercise claim with
another fundamental right or liberty interest. It was the amalgamated nature
of the claims which triggered closer scrutiny.' The sacramental peyote users,
however, did not have a associated right to transform their free exercise claim
into a hybrid claim.'
Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion, eschewing the analytical
gymnastics of Scalia's opinion. O'Connor applied the Sherbert test, but found
that Oregon's interest in the uniform application of its dangerous drug laws
overrode the plaintiffs' free exercise claim. O'Connor objected to the belief-
conduct distinction at the heart of the plurality's reasoning.74
In contrast, Justice Blackmun also applied the Sherbert test, but in dissent.
Blackmun disagreed with Justice O'Connor's result, arguing that the state's
intangible drug enforcement policy concerns combined with peyote's
recreational unattractiveness were insufficient to meet the compelling interest
threshold.75
67. Id. at 230-57.
68. See Tepker, Hallucinations, supra note 32, at 39-44.
69. See Whitehead, Demise, supra note 32, at 110-13. The belief-conduct distinction is
discussed supra at notes 33-35, 49-52.
70. Id. at 109-12; Tepker, Hallucinations, supra note 32, at 12-22 (citing Minersville School
Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (overruled flag salute case); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (child labor); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)
Braunfeld (Sunday closing); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437(1971) (national security);
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)(balancing case))
71. See Whitehead, Demise, supra note 32, at 112 (citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252
(1982); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Assn., 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987)).
72. See Tepker, Hallucinations, supra note 32, at 24-27.
73. lit at 24.
74. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894-96 (1990).
75. See id. at 907-21.
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C. Congress Restores: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and The
American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994
1. The RFRA Coalition
Reaction to Smith was overwhelmingly swift and critical. Fifty prominent
law professors petitioned the court for a rehearing of the case, but the Court
denied their request.' The Court announced the Smith decision on April 17,
1990, and reaction to it in the political branches of government was rapid. In
July 1990, RFRA was introduced in the house and by October in the
Senate.' The bill was introduced in 102d Congress, and the House held
hearings in the summer and fall of 1992." More than fifty organizations
joined together in an "unprecedented" joint effort to work for RFRA's passage.
Groups normally at odds with many conservative sects, such as the ACLU
and People for the American Way, united with their erstwhile courtroom foes
to secure passage of RFRA." In May 1993, RFRA passed the House on a
unanimous voice vote." The Senate passage was slowed by a contentious
debate over a prison amendment that failed 58-41. RFRA passed the Senate
with only three no votes in October 1993. On November 16, 1993, President
Clinton signed RFRA into law."'
2. RFRA's Structure
Congressional strategists and First Amendment lawyers determined that a
law replacing Sherbert and Yoder might be adjudged as within Congress'
Fourteenth Amendment powers.' The final version of RFRA allayed the
concerns of some scholars that merely restoring the deracinated version of the
compelling interest test that Smith supplanted would not significantly change
the judiciary's free exercise decisions." RFRA is a brief, simple statute with
only five parts. The first section of RFRA reports the congressional findings
and declaration of purposes:
76. 496 U.S. 913 (1990).
77. RFRA Chronology, Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs (visited Mar. 7, 1998)
<www.Re-ligious-freedom.org/chronology.html> [hereinafter BJCPA].
78. Id.
79. Conkle, supra note 32, at 88-89.
80. Id.
81. BJCPA, supra note 77.
82. See e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. REV.
221; Michael W. McConnell, Should Congress Pass Legislation Restoring the Broader
Interpretation of Free Exercise of Religion?, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181 (1992).
83. See Lupu, Supreme Court Centrism, supra note 61, at 272-73.
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(a) Findings. The Congress finds that -
(1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise
of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the
First Amendment to the Constitution;
(2) Laws "neutral" toward religion may burden religious
exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious
exercise;
(3) governments should not substantially burden religious
exercise without compelling justification;
(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S, 872 (1990) the
Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the
government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws
of neutral toward religion; and
(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal
court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances
between religious liberty and competing prior governmental
interestsO
Section 2000bb(b) states RFRA's purpose to legislatively circumvent the
effects of Smith by extending the compelling interest balancing test to a wider
group of free exercise claims:
(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases
where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and
(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious
exercise is substantially burdened by government.'
RFRA's third part, section 2000bb-1, provides the statute's substantive
protection:
(a) In general[:] Government shall not substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of
this section.
(b) Exception[:] Government may substantially burden a
person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person - (1) is in furtherance of
a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (1994).
85. Id.
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(c) Judicial relief[:] A person whose religious exercise has
been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation
as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain
appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim
or defense under this section shall be governed by the general
rules of standing under article ImI of the Constitution.'
The fourth RFRA section provides statutory definitions." Section 2000bb-3
grants RFRA broad prospective and retrospective applicability to virtually all
acts of government:
(a) In general[:] This chapter applies to all Federal and State
law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or
otherwise, and whether adopted before or after November 16,
1993.
(b) Rule of construction[:] Federal statutory law adopted after
November 16, 1993 is subject to this chapter unless such law
explicitly excludes such application by reference to this chapter.
(c) Religious belief unaffected[:] Nothing in this chapter shall
be construed to authorize any government to burden any religious
belief.u
The final section of RFRA attempts to limit the statute from facilitating
Establishment Clause violations and to prevent establishment of religion
claims by opponents of RFRA-motivated religious exceptions:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to affect, interpret, or
in any way address that portion of the First Amendment
prohibiting laws respecting the establishment of religion (referred
to in this section as the "Establishment Clause"). Granting
government funding, benefits, or exemptions, to the extent
permissible under the Establishment Clause, shall not constitute
a violation of this chapter. As used in this section, the term
"granting," used with respect to government funding, benefits, or
exemptions, does not include the denial of government funding,
benefits, or exemptions. 9
3. Amendment to American Indian Religious Freedom Act
An elegantly simple solution to Smith, which would have allowed a peyote
exemption for at least one of the defendants," could have been for the Court
86. Id. § 2000bb-1.
87. Id. § 2000bb-2.
88. Id. § 2000bb-3 (emphasis added).
89. Id. § 2000bb-4.
90. One of the Smith defendants was a non-Indian member of the Native American Church.
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to carve out a federal exception to the Oregon drug statute based on the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 (AIRFA).9' AIRFA was
Congress' response to Indian religious infringements on a variety of fronts,
including preservation and access to sacred sites, possession of eagle feathers
and other sacred objects, and drug law enforcement intrusions on peyotism.'
The statute established a federal policy of protecting and preserving
traditional religions of Native Americans through a brief aspirational
statement:
On and after August 11, 1978, it shall be the policy of the United
States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent
right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional
religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native
Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to sites, use and
possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through
ceremonials and traditional rites.'
Despite its lofty rhetoric, AIRFA, had virtually no effect in court
challenges to Indian religious free exercise claims. For example, in Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n the Court ignored AIRFA as
a basis for a free exercise claim. The U.S. Forest Service (USFS) triggered
the controversy while attempting to complete a seventy-five-mile paved road
linking two California towns, Gasquet and Orleans, by proposing construction
of a six-mile segment through the Chimney Rock section of the Six Rivers
National Forest." During an environmental impact study and subsequent
cultural study, the USFS discovered that Chimney Rock was historically and
currently used for religious observances by the Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa
tribes of the adjacent Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation.' The USFS study
determined that no practical route for the road could avoid impacting the
Lindefjeld, supra note 61, at 232 n.67. Under some theories of American Indian Religious
Freedom Act and the 1994 amendment, a non-Indian would not fall within the scope of tribal
protection as a bona fide member of a protected cultural and political entity. See generally
Michael J. Simpson, Accommodating Indian Religions: The Proposed 1993 Amendments to the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 54 MoNT. L. REv. 19, 23-32, 47-49 (1993) (discussing
the federal government's trust doctrine responsibility as applied to protecting indigenous
religions).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994). Professor Tepker's attack on Scalia's Smith analysis raises the
AIRFA possibility, but Tepker fails to explain how the Court could have reconciled using AIFRA
in Smith with the limitation of AIFRA in Lyng only two years earlier. Compare Tepker,
Hallucinations, supra note 32, with infra notes 94-101.
92. Beeson, supra note 63, at 1162-63.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994).
94. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). The case is extensively discussed by commentators. See e.g.,
Simpson, supra note 90, at 34-37; Beeson, supra note 63, at 1165-67.
95. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 442.
96. Id. at 442-43.
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public land-based religious sites. An additional complicating factor was the
USFS' decision to allow timber harvesting, but limiting cutting to outside one-
half mile protective zones around the identified religious sites." Congress
intervened to defuse the exploding court battle between the USFS, the tribes
and environmentalists, enacting the California Wilderness Act of 1984." The
statute banned the timber plan but protected the road project."
The Supreme Court rejected the tribal challenge to the road under Free
Exercise Clause and AIRFA theories. The Court reasoned that building the
road, while destructive to current Indian practices, did not implicate the Free
Exercise Clause because claimants were not coerced into altering their bdliefs
nor were their beliefs punished by the USFS project on federal land."w The
Court discarded AIFRA by arguing that it did not create any enforceable
rights or a cause of action.' Thus, the Lyng Court relegated AIFRA to
mere resolutionary status, removing it from the Smith Court's calculus.
In 1994, Congress responded partially to the Court's end run around
AIFRA by amending the law to specifically protect the ceremonial use of
peyote. in tribal ceremonies."° Congress found that "the traditional
ceremonial use of the peyote cactus as a religious sacrament has for centuries
been integral to a way of life, and significant in perpetuating Indian tribes and
cultures" and that it was legally protected under federal law since 1965 and
in at least twenty-eight states."n Congress also found that the failure of
twenty-two states to protect the "ceremonial use of peyote by Indian religious
practitioners" results in a "lack of uniformity [that] has created hardship for
Indian people who participate in such religious ceremonies.""IW Much like
in RFRA, Congress specifically named and criticized Smith and found that the
Court's revised free exercise jurisprudence creates "the lack of adequate and
clear legal protection for the religious use of peyote by Indians [which] may
97. Id. at 444.
98I. Pub. L. No. 98-425, 98 Stat. 1619.
99. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 444.
100. Id. at 452-53.
101. 1d at 455.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a (1994).
103. Id. § 1996a(a)(1)-(3).
104. Id. § 1996a(a)(3) (emphasis added). Section (c)(l) defines an Indian as a member of
an Indian tribe. Section (c)(2) defines an Indian tribe as
any tribe, band, nation, pueblo, or other organized group or community of Indians,
including any Alaska Native village (as defined in, or established pursuant to, the
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (43 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.)), which is
recognized as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the
United States to Indians because of their status as Indians.
Id. § 1996a(c)(2). Section (c)(3) recognizes two elements to an Indian religion: A religion
practiced by Indians, and that the religion's origin and interpretation is from "within a traditional
Indian culture or community." Id. § 1996a(c)(3).
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serve to stigmatize and marginalize Indian tribes and cultures, and increase the
risk that they will be exposed to discriminatory treatment."'l'
The 1994 AIFRA amendment extended federal protection to the use,
possession, or transportation of peyote only in connection with bona fide
ceremonial rituals of a traditional Indian religion." Reversing Smith as
applied to Indian defendants, the amendment prohibits discrimination against
Indians in public benefits because of peyotism.1 n The amendment also
empowers the Drug Enforcement Administration to regulate and register
peyote producers and distributors, but specifically disclaims preempting or
conflicting with a Texas anti-peyote statute." Furthermore, the revised
AIFRA does not permit unfettered use of peyote by qualifying Indians. The
Amendment allows federal law enforcement, transportation, and safety-related
restrictions promulgated after consultation with representatives of "traditional
Indian religions for which the sacramental use of peyote is integral to their
practice" and subject to RFRA's resurrected free exercise balancing test.""
Prisoners neither gain nor lose protection under the amendment, because the
power for ceremonial peyote access is left to the discretion of prison
officials."' Motorists and military personnel also fail to gain any
independent defenses to peyote-related charges from the AIFRA amendment,
unless the underlying regulations are unreasonable."'
4. Reactions and Effects
Even before Congress completed RFRA's passage, the Court began to reign
in the logical and predictable effects of Smith. In Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,"' the Court defined an outer marker for
facially neutral laws of general applicability. A Santeria priest planned to
open a Santeria religion"' worship center, which would feature public
105. Id. § 1996a(a)(4)-(a)(5).
106. Id. § 1996a(b)(1). See generally Michael Waldman, 25 AM. JUR. 2D Drugs and
Controlled Substances §§ 23, 172 (1996).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (1994).
108. Id. § 1996a(b)(2)-(b)(3). Section (b)(3) provides that AIFRA does not preempt TEx.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.111(a) (West 1994).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(4) (1994).
110. Id. § 1996a(b)(5).
111. Id. § 1996a(b)(6)-(b)(7). Both sections are subject to RFRA. Section (b)(7) requires the
Secretary of Defense to consult with representatives of the traditional Indian religious groups
affected before promulgating any restrictions relating to ceremonial peyotism.
112. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). Lukumi was argued on November 4, 1992 and decided June 11,
1993, several months before RFRA's final passage. See supra note 81.
113. The Santeria religion began in nineteenth-century Cuba. Western African slaves from the
Yoruba tribe blended their traditional religion into Roman Catholicism. Cuban persecution forced
Santeria to develop secretly. Although there are an estimated 50,000 devotees among the Cuban
refugee population in Florida, it is seldom practiced openly. The religion, also known as "the way
of the saints," teaches that every individual has a destiny from God fulfilled through the assistance
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sacrificial killing of chickens, pigeons, doves, ducks, guinea pigs, goats, sheep
and turtles."4 The Hialeah, Florida City Council reacted to public outrage
by passing several ordinances outlawing ritualized animal slaughtering by any
person or group." 5 The* ordinances allowed exceptions for non-ritualized
killing and kosher slaughter if performed at a properly zoned and licensed
enterprise and involved only animals "specifically raised for food
purposes. ""6 The largest tactical obstacle for Hialeah's lawyers in the case,
however, may have been defusing the intentional targeting implications arising
from inflammatory anti-Santeria rhetoric used by some city council members
and city officials during the legislative debates."' But unlike the Mormon
polygamists 115 years earlier or the peyotists only three years before, the
Santera cult members defeated the government in the Supreme Court.
Reversing the trial and appellate courts, the Supreme Court held the
Hialeah ordinances were not neutral, generally applicable laws within the
Smith formula, but were specifically targeted at Santeria practice."' The
ordinances had an impermissibly religious motivation and were underinclusive
in protecting the city's articulated interest of reducing animal cruelty and
protecing public health."' Applying the compelling interest balancing test,
the Court reasoned that the sacrifices were both a traditional type of religious
ritual, with historic practice in Judaism and contemporary practice in Islam,
as well as integral to Santeria theology."a Conversely, the ordinance was not
narrowly tailored to advance the city's interests, putting an undue burden on
the religion's free exercise, right.'' Furthermore, the Court held that
Hialeah's interests underlying the ordinances were less than compelling.'
of spirits called orishas. Santeria adherents demonstrate their devotion to the orishas through animal
sacrifice. These sacrifices are arguably central to Santeria. Orishas are not immortal, but depend
on sacrifices for survival. Thus, ritual sacrifices are undertaken in association with various
important events, including birth, marriage, and death rites, for healing, when initiating new priests
and members, and as part of an annual celebration. Often the sacrificial animals ae consumed.
Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 524 (citing trial court fact findings and 13 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REuGIOON 66-67
(Mircea Eliade ed., 1987); 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN RE1IGIOUS EXPERIENCE 183
(Charles H. Lippy & Peter W. Williams eds., 1988); MIGENE GONZAIEZ-WIPPLER, SANTERIA, THE
RELIGIcN 3-4 (1989); MiGENE GONZALEZ-WIPPLER, THE SANTERIA EXPERIENCE 105 (1982)).
114. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 525-26.
115. ld. at 526-28.
116. Ld. at 537.
117. Id. at 541-42. Interestingly, most of the statements cited by the Court were made by
officials with Hispanic surnames, giving rise to the unstated inference that this was an internecine
conflict.
118. ld. at 531-32. The Court noted that the trial court actually used a standard more strict
than Smith required, but the case was decided before Smith. Il at 530.
119. Id. at 538-542.
120. Ld. at 525, 534-35.
121. Id. at 546-47.
122. Id. at 547.
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Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurred in part and in
judgment but objected to the Court's extensive assessment of the Hialeah City
Council's motive behind the ordinances. Scalia concluded that "it is virtually
impossible to determine the singular 'motive' of a collective legislative body,
and this Court has a long tradition of refraining from such inquiries."'"
Scalia argued, based on textual analysis, that the appropriate First Amendment
inquiry is not about legislative motives but about statutory effects.'24 Justice
Souter, who was appointed to the Court after Smith, used his separate
concurrence in Lukumi to question the precedential validity of Smith."
Extensively reviewing Scalia's use of precedent and citing scholarly criticism,
Souter concluded that "whatever Smith's virtues, they do not include a
comfortable fit with settled law."'" Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice
O'Connor, also attacked Smith in a concurring opinion.'" Blackmun
contended that religious targeting per se fails First Amendment analysis."
But even in cases of neutral law, Blackmun asserted that compelling interest
balancing is the proper test, not Smith's bright line rule.
The clear message of Lukumi was that the Court will not tolerate overt or
intentional targeting under the guise of a superficially neutral law.'29 But the
contours and viability of Smith's return to Reynolds remained uncertain and
contested in cases where more sophisticated legislatures act with outwardly
neutral motives, but with detrimental effects on fringe group religious
123. Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted).
124. Id
125. Id. at 559-77.
126. Id at 571.
127. Id at 577-80.
128. Id. at 580.
129. Tepker argues that "superficially neutral law" is a synonym for "law of general
applicability." See Tepker, Hallucinations, supra note 32, at 2. Such loaded language may be
useful for partisan advocacy, but analytically it implies that comprehensive, universal rules are
inherently pretextual. Clearly that is not the true. Majoritarian legal formulations based on highly
specific legal traditions may tend to disadvantage certain minority groups, but without any
particular intention of blind-eyed analysis or premeditated, deliberate targeting. For example,
murder laws cast a broad prohibitive net which includes banning human sacrifice. Under Tepker's
rhetorical approach, murder laws would be "superficially neutral" because they also ensnare
primitive, inhumane ritual killing. Semanticist S.I. Hayakawa theorizes that words have both
informative connotations and affective connotations. Informative connotations are meanings
including definitions and denotations. Affective connotations are the atmosphere of emotions and
feelings that a word incites. S.I. HAYAKAWA, The Double Task of Language, in LANGUAGE,
supra note 34, at 62-72. Tepker's inductive categorization might technically fall into the
informative definition of "superficial" in that the laws are facially neutral. But Tepker's
terminology unreliably overstates the affective case with a built-in judgment that implies either
wrongful motive or shallow, cursory, uncritical policy judgments. A more reliable approach
would be to restrict the judgment-laden label "superficially neutral" to situations of apparent
legislative bias, such as in Lukumi. Laws based on neutral principle and specific legal traditions
ought to be presumed and described as "neutral laws of general applicability" until their
intentional or negligent bias is otherwise proven.
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practices. Although Smith's critics on the Court had not marshaled enough
votes lo reconsider it, RFRA soon attempted legislatively to accomplish the
evisceration of the peyote precedent.
RFR.A generated a second wave of academic analysis.' " Although
politically popular, RFRA generated some controversy outside of academia
and the D.C. Beltway. Several states began to see a trend, if an explosion, of
frivolous prison law suits.' A LEXIS/NEXIS search by lawyers briefing
the case for a group of Attorneys General found that 189 prison-related RFRA
claim cases had been decided.' Prison officials became burdened with
assessing and accommodating RFRA claims, diverting resources from other
operational tasks.' Claims which would have failed under the Shabazz
"reasonablility" standard were resuscitated by RFRA's tougher scrutiny."
130. See supra notes 32, 82; Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An
Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 VILL. L. Rrv. 1 (1994); Joanne
Brant, Taking the Supreme Court At Its Word: The Implications for RFRA and Separation of
Powers, 56 MONT. L. REv. 5 (1995); Jay S. Bybee, Taking Liberties With the First Amendment:
Congress, Section 5, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1539 (1995);
Abbott Cooper, Dam the RFRA at the Prison Gate: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act's
Impact on Correctional Litigation, 56 MONT. L. REv. 325 (1995); Christopher V. Eisgruber &
Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 NY.U.
L. Rev. 437 (1994); Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free
Exercise Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65 (1996); Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act: Letting the Fox into the Henhouse Under Cover of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 16 CARDoZO L. REv. 357 (1994); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free
Exercise Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw. U.L. REV.
1106 (1994); Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet, 56 MONT. L. REv. 145 (1995)
[hereinafter Laycock, Ratchet]; Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMp.
LEGAL IssuEs 313 (1996); Douglas Laycock & Oliver Thomas, Interpreting the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 73 TEX. L. Rev. 209 (1994); Rex E. Lee, The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act: Legislative Choice and Judicial Review, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 73; M. Paulsen,
A RFR Runs Through It, 56 MONT. L. REv. 249 (1995); Daniel J. Solove, Note, Faith Profaned:
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Religion in the Prisons, 106 YALE L.J. 459 (1996);
Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of the Red Herrings: A Defense of the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 69 S. CAL. L REV. 589 (1996).
131. Brief for [Thirteen] Amici States in Support of Petitioner at *3, Boerne (No. 95-2074),
1996 WL 695519. The amii states are Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,
Mississippi, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, and the territories of American Samoa, Guam And The Virgin Islands.
132. ld.
133. Id. at *4. Ironically, RFRA-supported inmate demands for diverse services and
assistance from prison chaplains may have produced the unintended effect of reduced religious
access for some inmates. For example, Colorado and Oklahoma became so disillusioned with
trying to accommodate RFRA claims that they abolished all state-funded chaplaincy programs.
Id. at 16.
134. Id. (citing O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987)). Many of the RFRA
claims prisoners attempted were entertaining, if not innovative. See e.g., Emel v. Mensinger, Civ.
No. 95-5197, 1996 U.S. DisL LEXIS 13498 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (satanist inmates purported a right
under RFRA to bum Bibles); United States v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 1494 (D. Wyo. 1995), all'd,
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RFRA had some noteworthy successes in protecting religious practices. For
example, in State v. Miller, a Wisconsin appeals court determined that the
state had not shown that requiring a florescent orange slow-moving vehicle
triangle on the rear of a Amish plaintiffs buggy was the least restrictive
manner of furthering traffic safety.'3 s In Werner v. McCotter, the 10th
Circuit found that a sweat lodge was central and fundamental to a prisoner's
free exercise rights.'" In an important employment law case, EEOC v.
Catholic University, a Title VII sex discrimination claim against a church-
affiliated university by a female canon law professor denied tenure was
successfully defended against. 37 The Catholic University court recognized
both the Title VII "ministerial exception"'38 and RFRA as a basis for the
decision.'39
RFRA, however, did not help some religious liberty claimants. For
example, in Church of Iron Oak v. City of Palm Bay a Wiccan "church" group
was denied a temporary restraining order to prevent a zoning board hearing
and further surveillance of a residence used for meetings. " The Arkansas
95 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1996) (inmate claimed membership in the "Church of Marijuana" required
prison official to make drug accommodations under RFRA)
135. 538 N.W. 2d 573 (,Vis. Ct. App. 1995), affid on other grounds, 539 N.W.2d 235 (Wis.
1996).
136. Werner v. McCotter, 49 F.3d 1476 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2625 (1995).
137. EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir 1996) (holding that government policy
against discrimination is not sufficient to outweigh a religious institution's interest in minister
selection freedom).
138. Civil Rights Act of 1964 §702(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-I (1994); Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d
at 461-63.
139. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at 467-70.
140. Church of Iron Oak v. City of Palm Bay, 868 F. Supp. 1361 (1994). The use of the
term "church" by the Wiccan plaintiffs and the court is an unfortunate delimitation of language.
The Wicean religion is a pantheistic, pre-Christian, pagan belief system based on "white magic."
Typically, wiccan groups are called covens, not churches, however the plaintiffs may have
adopted the "church" label to seem less controversial. See generally Craig S. Hawkins, The
Modern World of Witchcraft: Part One, CHRISTIAN REs. J., Winter/Spring 1990, at 8, available
in Institute for Christian Leadership website (visited Mar. 21, 1998) <http:/iclnet.orglpub/
resources/textlcri/cri-jrnl/cj0064a.txt>. The term church translates two Greek words used in the
New Testament for the body of Christian Believers: Kyriakon and ekklesia. See THEOLOGICAL
DICTIONARY OF THE NEw TEsTAMENT 397-98 (Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich eds.,
Geoffrey W. Bromiley trans., abridged one vol. ed., 1985); R.L. Omanson, The Church, in
EVANGELICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 34, at 231-33. The origin of the church derives, according
to Christian doctrine, from Jesus. Matthew 16:17-19; Matthew 18:17. Traditionally, courts have
limited the use of the term to
the religious society founded and established by Jesus Christ, to receive, preserve
and propagate His doctrines and ordinances. It may also mean a body of
communicants gathered into a church order; body or community of Christians,
united under one form of government by the profession of the same faith and the
observance of the same ritual and ceremonies ....
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 242 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). In an earlier time, the
sacrilegious use of the term church for a Wiccan coven, arguably the antithesis of a Christian
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Supreme Court avoided RFRA in Osborne v. Power,' holding that a
massive Christmas light display in a residential zone was a public and private
nuisance which failed to implicate a free exercise issue. RFRA also failed to
assist landlords who objected to laws forcing them to accept unmarried
couples as tenants. In Smith v. Commission of Fair Employment and
Housing," the California Supreme Court reasoned that a landlord can avoid
the rental real estate business to avoid a burden on the landlord's religious
convictions or free exercise rights. The Alaska Supreme Court in Swanner v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Commission'43 found that even if RFRA applies to
neutral housing regulations and is within Congress' power, Alaska's
compelling state interest in prohibiting marital status discrimination outweighs
the landlord's RFRA free exercise defense. Justice Thomas vigorously
dissented from the Court's denial of certiorari. He posited that the Alaska
decision "drains the word compelling of any meaning and seriously
undermines the protection for the exercise of religion that Congress so
emphatically mandated in RFRA."'" Thomas also noted that lower courts
"exhibited considerable confusion" in applying the resurrected Sherbert-Yoder
compelling interest balancing test in cases decided after RFRA's passage.4
RFRA disappointed many Indian religious liberty claimants as well. For
example, in United States v. Jim, a member of the Yakama Nation
unsuccessfully invoked RFRA in defending against a charge of killing
eagles." Several Indian prisoners also received no additional protection
under RFRA. The Eighth Circuit held in Hamilton v.Schriro that prison
policies prohibiting a weekly sweat lodge observance and enforcing a uniform
hair length standard were narrowly tailored to advance the compelling
government interest of prison safety."7 The Federal District Court for
Hawaii found RFRA constitutional in a temporary restraining order application
which was mooted when prison officials voluntarily accommodated the Indian
inmate's request for exemption from the hair length regulation, and for
providing a spiritual counselor and a medicine bag with artifacts including,
eagle feathers, sweet grass and sage." But in a subsequent case, Abordo v.
Hawaii, the same district court found similar regulations enforced against an
"alleged Native American" to not violate RFRA's standards.'49 The Fifth
group, inight have violated blasphemy laws. In modem times, however, such language abuse is
emblematic of religious insensitivity and ignorance.
141. 890 S.W.2d 574 (Ark. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2580 (1995).
142. 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2531 (1996).
142.. 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994).
144.. Swanner, 115 S. Ct. at 462.
145. Id.
146. 888 F. Supp. 1058 (D. Or. 1995).
147. 74 F.3d 1545 (8th cir. 1996), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 193 (1996).
148. Belgard v. Hawaii, 883 F. Supp. 510 (D. Haw. 1995).
1491. 938 F. Supp. 656, 659 (D. Haw. 1996)
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Circuit, in Diaz v. Collins denied an Aztec claimant, who was also reputed to
be in the Mexican Mafia, an exemption to prison hair length and headband
rules, reciting the state's compelling interest in prison security."5
The Federal District Court for the Southern District of Ohio extended the
inmate cases even further to prison employees in Blanken v. Ohio Department
of Rehabilitation and Corrections.' The claimant, classified as a corrections
officer, worked in a prison as a food service coordinator. He also belonged
to the Hokshichankiya Society, a group practicing traditional Indian religious
rites. The district court found that the state's hair length regulation was the
least restrictive means to achieve the compelling interests of safety, discipline
and esprit de corps." Thus, RFRA proved to be easy for some courts to
avoid, whether by defining the issues outside RFRA's scope, or by delimiting
the compelling interest standard. A few courts foreshadowed the Boerne
court's RFRA demolition by holding the act an unconstitutional exercise of
congressional power."
Ill Boerne and RFRA's Flawed Foundation
A. The Litigants' Views on RFRA
"This case is not about religious liberty," Marci Hamilton boldly claimed
as she began her oral argument for the City of Boerne in the Supreme Court.
Hamilton dramatically continued before being interrupted by the inevitable
peppering of questions by the Justices:
This case is about Federal power. It is about the ability of the
United States Constitution to restrain Congress, the branch most
likely to be controlled by interest groups and by opinion polls,
from engaging in a hostile takeover of the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
which was passed in an emotional and heated response to this
Court's determination in Employment Division v. Smith, is a
brazen attempt to reinterpret the Free Exercise Clause and to
impose that reinterpretation on the courts, on the State, and to
shift the balance of power between church and state dramatically
in favor of the churches. This is the worst of legislative
overreaching, which violates the fundamental structural
constitutional guarantees, the separation of powers, federalism,
and separation between church and state."
150. 114 F.3d 69 (5th Cir. 1995).
151. 944 F. Supp. 1359 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
152. Id.
153. See e.g. Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 951 F. Supp. 83 (D. Md. 1997); In re Hodge,
200 B.R. 884 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1996).
154. Transcript of Oral Argument at *3-*4, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 87109.
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Hamilton's introduction aptly summarizes the City of Boerne position which
ultimately persuaded a majority of the Court. The City of Boerne made a
three-pronged attack invoking basic structural doctrines to paint RFRA as a
reactionary, extremist attempt to subvert the Court's authority to interpret the
Constitution.
In their brief, Boerne argued first that RFRA violates the separation of
powers doctrine.55 Invoking two of the Court's most venerable precedents,
Marbury v. Madison" and Baker v. Carr," the City of Boerne challenged
a central assumption underlying RFRA by asserting that the Court has
superior, if not exclusive authority under Article Three"8 to interpret the
Constitution."9 Thus RFRA, according to the City of Boerne, was an
unconstitutional intrusion into the Court's interpretive jurisdiction. If the
Constitution functions as fundamental law, limiting Congress to only
delegated powers while dividing governmental power between the three
federal branches and the states, these limits would be undermined by allowing
Congress to usurp the Court's interpretive function through legislative
circumvention." The City of Boeme's brief then reminded the Court that
RFRA was an overt legislative attempt to overrule Smith.6' The brief noted
that 405 pages in RFRA's legislative history" contained statements about
Smith, indicating congressional disapprobation for the Court's current free
exercise jurisprudence motivated RFRA's enactment." The City of Boerne's
brief then concluded that the Court must strike down RFRA to preserve the
balance of power between the courts and Congress."
The second prong of Boerne's attack undercut the legitimacy of Congress's
asserted constitutional basis for RFRA. The City of Boerne argued that RFRA
is not within the scope of congressional enforcement power under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment." The brief warned the Court that upholding
155. Brief of Petitioner City of Boeme at *12-*26, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1996 WL 689630,
156. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). "[It is] emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is." Id. at 177.
157. 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (arguing that the Supreme Court is the "ultimate interpreter
of the Constitution").
158. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2.
159. Brief of Petitioner City of Boerne at *13, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1996 WL 689630.
160. Id. at *13-*15.
161. Id at *15-*22.
162. Id. at *19 n.3. See generally The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990: Hearings
on H.R. 5377 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991:
Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); The Religious Freedom Restoration Act:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); S. REP. No.
103-111 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892; H.R. REP. No. 103-88 (1993).
163. Brief of Petitioner City of Boerne at *19-*23, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1996 WL 689630.
164. Id. at *23-*26.
165. Id. at *26-*46. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "The Congress
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"Congress's attempt with RFRA to force state and local governments to
accommodate religious conduct more than this Court has said the Constitution
requires runs headlong over a dangerous precipice."'" First, Boerne
contended that RFRA is like no other statute because it blatantly attempted to
overrule the Court's interpretation of the Constitution in an entire class of
cases.'67 Second, Boerne asserted that RFRA inharmoniously fit with
McCulloch v. Maryland"r by violating the Court's bedrock interpretive
principle of enumerated powers.69 RFRA, according to Boerne, fatally lies
outside congressional enforcement power because it purports to enforce rights
against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment that are not protected
by the First Amendment.' Boerne posited that RFRA also was not
specifically tailored to achieve a constitutional purpose, as required by the
McCulloch test.'
The City of Boerne's brief also attacked two prominent defenses of
congressional power to enact RFRA. Attempting to debunk the Fifth Circuit's
theory that RFRA falls within the remedial power of Congress under section
5, Boerne insisted that the targeted voting rights enforcement laws upheld in
Katzenbach v. Morgan'" and City of Rome v. United States"3 were not
examples of a broad remedial power, but were limited, detailed statutes
addressing specific, discriminatory voting practices, and were supported by
congressional fact findings linking the statutory remedies with the underlying
constitutional guarantees. 74 In contrast, Boerne viewed RFRA as an
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S.
CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
166. Brief of Petitioner City of Boerne at *27, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1996 WL 689630.
167. Id. at *29.
168. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
169. Id. at 30. The enumerated powers test articulated by Justice Marshall has three prongs:
(1) "Let the end be legitimate"; (2) "Let [the end] be within the scope of the constitution," and
(3) "[AII means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."
McCullouch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421. The City of Boerne contended that RFRA violated each
prong of the test. See Brief of Petitioner City of Boerne at *30-*42, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1996
WL 689630.
170. Brief of Petitioner City of Boerne at *30-*31, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1996 WL 689630
(citing the Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause in Smith and Lukumi as the scope
of the First Amendment).
171. lid at *31.
172. 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding under Section 5 a federal voting rights statute which
allowed Spanish-speaking Puerto Ricans migrants to vote in New York elections despite state
English literacy laws, which were previously upheld in Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360
U.S. 45 (1959)).
173. 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (upholding preclearance of new voting standards if they would
have a racially discriminatory effect on voting).
174. Brief of Petitioner City of Boeme at *32-*34, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1996 WL 689630.
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extremely overbroad measure, lacking corresponding factual support.75 The
brief also attacked the theory that Section 5 grants Congress substantive power
to reinterpret the Constitution."76 Boerne maintained that interpreting
language in Katzenbach v. Morgan'" as authority for congressional power
to expand the scope of constitutional guarantees is not only distorting the
precedent but that such power was expressly rejected in subsequent cases.'
Boerne's final component in its second prong of assault was that RFRA
violates the federalism limitations structured into Section 5.'79 Citing
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,"" United States v. Lopez,"' New York
v. United States," and Gregory v. Ashcroft," the City of Boerne insisted
that principles of federalism require Congress to respect state integrity when
legislating in areas of state authority."4 Land use control traditionally falls
within the interest of the states. RFRA, according to the City of Boerne,
derogates sovereign state power and skews historic preservation contests
against local autonomy." Although the Fourteenth Amendment limits the
Tenth Amendment, Boerne claimed that it did repeal the Tenth Amendment
or grant Congress power to require extra-constitutional accommodations by
the states."
175. Id. at *35.
176. Id. at *38-*42.
177. Answering Justice Harlan's dissent, Justice Brennan noted
[Section] 5 does not grant Congress power to exercise discretion in the other
direction and to enact "statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due
process decisions of this Court." We emphasize that Congress' power under § 5
is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5
grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.
Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.
178. Brief of Petitioner City of Boeme at *39, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1996 WL 689630
(citing Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 220-21 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 262 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); ("I have
always read Oregon v. Mitchell as finally imposing a limitation on the extent to which Congress
may substitute its own judgment for that of the states and assume this Court's 'role of final
arbite... ."); see also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) (citing United
States v. Reese, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 214, 217-18 (1875); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 138
(1903)).
179. Brief of Petitioner City of Boeme at *42-*46, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1996 WL 689630.
180. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996). See generally Michael Grant, Comment, Seminole Tribe v.
Florida - Extinction of the New Buffalo, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 171 (1997).
181. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (striking down a federal "gun-free school zones" law as beyond
congressional power under the Commerce Clause).
182. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating statutes which required states to provide for in-state
disposal of radioactive waste).
183. 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (exempting state judicial mandatory retirement regulations from
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
184. Brief of Petitioner City of Boerne at *43, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1996 WL 689630.
185. d at *45.
186. Id. at *45-*46.
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The City of Boerne's third major strike against RFRA was that the statute
is an establishment of religion." Invoking the often-maligned Lemon v.
Kurtzman' test, Boerne argued that RFRA has no secular purpose, no
neutral effect on religion, and creates excessive entanglement between
government and religion." The City additionally asserted that RFRA
impermissibly functions as a global endorsement of religion, favoring religion
over non-religion. Boerne's attack on RFRA concluded that "[w]hatever the
merits of Congress's objection to the Smith decision, it cannot 'fix' religious
liberty in flagrant disregard of settled principles of separation of powers,
federalism, and church-state relations."'"
Archbishop Flores and RFRA's apologists, of course, held a more
sympathetic view of the statute's constitutionality. Douglas Laycock,
representing the Archbishop, began his response to the City's oral argument
by declaring: "This case is controlled by an unbroken tradition of
congressional practice and judicial decision that begins with the Civil War
amendments themselves. From the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to RFRA in
1993, Congress has always understood that it has power to make
187. Id. at *46-*49.
188. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon has been criticized by a majority of the Court and
according to Geoffrey Stone, et. al., the Court has not relied on it to invalidate any state action
since 1985. GEOFFREY R. SToNE Er AL., CONsTrrmONAL LAW 1547 (3d ed. 1996). An often-
cited and memorable criticism of Lemon was offered by Justice Scalia in Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993):
Like some ghoul in a late- night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave
and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and
school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District. Its most recent
burial, only last Term, was, to be sure, not fully six feet under: Our decision in
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), conspicuously avoided using the supposed
"test" but also declined the invitation to repudiate it. Over the years, however, no
fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices have, in their own opinions,
personally driven pencils through the creature's heart (the author of today's opinion
repeatedly), and a sixth has joined an opinion doing so.
The secret of the Lemon tests survival, I think, is that it is so easy to kill. It
is there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish it to do so, but we can
command it to return to the tomb at will. When we wish to strike down a practice
it forbids, we invoke it; when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore
it entirely. Sometimes, we take a middle course, calling its three prongs "no more
than helpful signposts." Such a docile and useful monster is worth keeping around,
at least in a somnolent state; one never knows when one might need him. For my
part, I agree with the long list of constitutional scholars who have criticized
Lemon and bemoaned the strange Establishment Clause geometry of crooked lines
and wavering shapes its intermittent use has produced.
Id. at 399-400 (citations omitted). Could it be that in the future, Smith will be viewed as the
Scalia-created ghoul of the Free Exercise Clause?
189. Brief of Petitioner City of Boeme at *47-*48, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1996 WL 689630.
190. Id at *49.
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constitutional rights effective in practice and to go beyond the floor set by this
Court."'' The strategy of RFRA's defenders was to depict the statute as both
consistent with prior Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation and as
a statute which permissibly advanced protection of a constitutional right in the
same direction as the Courts more limited view of the baseline. The key to
this approach was to convince the Court to accept that RFRA is nothing more
than a logical parallel of statutes like the Voting Rights Acts" and that
Justice Brennan's broad conception of the Section 5's scope in Katzenbach v.
Morgan193 should be extended to legitimize RFRA's sweeping interference
with local interests. The Archbishop's brief attempted this task through five
major arguments.
The Archbishop's first argument was that the Court ought to defer to
congressional judgment on RFRA's constitutionality." Perhaps realizing that
the presumption of constitutionality argument was at best an unlikely basis for
the Court to dispose of the case, Flores' brief devotes only about a page to
developing this argument. Flores' reasoning on the presumption issue
concluded that "RFRA represents the considered constitutional judgment of an
equal and coordinate branch of government."'95 This statement flirts with
what Alexander Bickel termed the Taney-Lincoln view on the meaning of a
constitutional decision.' Under the Taney-Lincoln view, the legislative and
executive branches are not bound by the principles or reasoning of judicial
precedents, but only by the Court's judgment in the specific case decided.'
Thus, each branch has an independent responsibility to interpret the
Constitution. In requesting deference to Congress on RFRA's constitutionality
in such broad terms, the Archbishop's brief impliedly invited the Court to
defer, in ultimate effect, to an apparent congressional reinterpretation of the
Free Exercise clause, but without explicitly adopting a radical version of the
Taney-Lincoln hypothesis that would elevate congressional constitutional
interpretations to equal status with the Court's own interpretations. In the oral
argument, Laycock was forced to disclaim any hint that Congress could
function as an interpretive co-equal:
191. Transcript of Oral Argument at *34, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 87109.
192. See Brief of Respondent Flores at *4, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 10293
(comparing RFRA's enactment with "various Voting Rights Acts" and to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
193. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). Brennan's view is discussed at supra note 177.
194. Brief of Respondent Flores at *5-*6, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 10293.
195. Id. at *6 (emphasis added).
196. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MoRALTY OF CONSENT 101-02 (1975).
197. Id. According to Bickel, Lincoln notably articulated his views in 1858 during the
Lincoln-Douglas debates and Justice Taney argued this view while he was the U.S. Attorney
General. Ironically, Lincoln's view was developed in response to the Dred Scott decision,
authored by Taney.
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QUESTION: ... Now, you admit, I suppose, that Congress
cannot come in and overrule a decision of this Court it doesn't
like by legislation.
MR. LAYCOCK: That is not contested.
QUESTION: Excuse me?
MR. LAYCOCK: Everyone agrees with that.
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. LAYCOCK: Congress cannot overrule the Court.9 '
And indeed, Boerne would not be decided on the arguably artificial and
formal distinctions latently concealed in the deference argument.
The Archbishop's second defense of RFRA was that it fell within delegated
congressional authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.'"
Seizing on strands of broad language in Katzenbach v. Morgan and a
number of other decisions, Flores posited that Section 5's "appropriate"
enforcement power can exceed the scope of substantive judicial interpretations
of the right being enforced.0' RFRA, according to the Archbishop, granted
federal statutory sanctuary against the burdensome or discriminatory effects
of facially neutral laws, and merely appended onto the Free Exercise Clause
prohibition against overt or purposeful religious discrimination. ' Flores
then recited a litany of statutes for the proposition that congressional
enforcement power was not limited to proven, obvious or deliberate
discrimination, disputing the City of Boerne's claim that RFRA uniquely
represented an unsupported exercise of substantive or remedial power.
Then the Archbishop's brief warned the Court of an apocalyptic Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement meltdown if RFRA was found unconstitutional:
Here are seventeen distinct statutory provisions.., that clearly go
beyond this Court's interpretation of the Constitution. These
statutes span 125 years of the nation's history.... These statutes
and their interpretations are deeply embedded in our law.
Americans who know little of the constitutional debate in this
case have relied on these laws for protection against exclusionary
voting rules, unnecessary testing requirements, discriminatory
pension and insurance benefits, and loss of employment due to
198. Transcript of Oral Argument at *35, Boerne (No. 95-2074). 1997 WL 87109.
199. Brief of Respondent Flores at *6-*43, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 10293.
200. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). "The power 'to enforce, by appropriate legislation' is independent
of the power to adjudicate. Congress is not confined 'to the insignificant role of abrogating only
those state laws that the judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional.'" Brief of
Respondent Flores at *7, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 10293 (citing Morgan, 384 U.S. at
649).
201. Brief of Respondent Flores at *6-*7, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 10293.
202. Id. at *8-*10.
203. ld. at *10-*18.
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pregnancy. All of these protections would be cast in doubt if the
judgment below were reversed; there cannot be a reversal without
a drastic shrinkage of the enforcement power."'
Attempting to allay fears that upholding RFRA's constitutionality would
lead to a drastic expansion of congressional power, the Archbishop offered a
theory to the Court about the limits of Section 5. First, the Archbishop
suggested that the Court need not determine the outer boundary of
congressional enforcement power to uphold RFRA. Then the brief candidly
admitted the delimiting risk of allowing Congress to enforce implied
fundamental rights found under a substantive theory of the Due Process
Clause or any classification which could be rationally found within the Equal
Protection Clause.' Structurally, Flores argued, such substantive activism
must be denied to Congress, but federal legislative enforcement should be
allowed when it has "a nexus with a constitutional right that, in the judgment
of this Court, is plausibly entitled to heightened scrutiny."' Therefore,
because the Court could theoretically determine,' and actually has
determined the requisite nexus,' Flores concluded that this places
congressional actions consistent with the First Amendment within Section 5's
"appropriate" enforcement power.' Congressional power to enforce
constitutional rights functions like a ratchet,2t allowing Congress to increase
protections in concert with the Court's interpretations, but not to reduce or
carve out exceptions to the Court's notions on the extent of constitutional
guarantees.2
The Archbishop next turned to reassuring the Court that Congress
rationally acted to grant necessary religious liberty shelter to minority and
majority faith adherents 12 The brief recounted testimony from the
congressional hearings which supported the determination that specific
legislative exceptions for particular religious practices, as well as ligating in
204. Id. at *18-*19 (emphasis added).
205. Id. at *22.
206. Id. at *22-*23.
207. The brief notes that Congress does not have to wait on a Court determination of a
nexus to act. Id. at *23 n.5.
208. I.e., the Court has held that the First Amendment applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court sometimes applies heightened scrutiny to First Amendment
rights. The nexus theory gives Congress maximum latitude to legislate under Section 5 on rights
recognizid by the Court, but subjects congressional recognition of new rights to the Court's veto.
209. Brief of Respondent Flores at *23, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 10293.
210. A ratchet is a mechanism, most commonly used in a wrench of the same name, which
mechanically restricts effective motion to one direction only. See WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 825 (5th ed. 1942).
211. Brief of Respondent Flores at *26-*28, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 10293. See
generally Laycock, Ratchet, supra note 130, at 145 (introducing an earlier law review formulation
of the argument).
212. Brief of Respondent Flores at *29, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 10293.
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the wake of Smith did not protect religious liberty as well as RFRA."3 The
brief contended that the need for RFRA was buttressed by an extensive
legislative record of specific free exercise intrusions, as well as statistics on
anti-minority religious sentiments which could poison local legislative
bodies.2t4 Flores next compared the congressional findings supporting RFRA
with the logically similar ones behind the law upheld in Morgan."t5 Finally,
the Archbishop's brief attacked the City's remedial/substantive distinction as
flawed and superficial, arguing that it turns on a determination of
congressional intent, rather than any meaningful substantive measurement." 6
Archbishop Flores further contended that because of incorporation, power
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment necessarily includes power to enforce
religious liberty."7 Supporting a broad view of the Fourteenth Amendment's
original intent, Flores dipped into the legislative history of the amendment and
contemporaneous enforcement legislation for proof that Congress intended a
broad enforcement power under Section 52 The Archbishop argued that
because of congressional suspicion and mistrust of the Supreme Court after
the Dred Scott decision,19 Congress would not have intended to limit
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement to only the extent protected by the
Court. 0
The Archbishop's third main defense of RFRA was that the statute did not
limit judicial power to interpret or decide the law."M Flores insisted that the
City's separation of powers argument was only a new label for the flawed
argument that congressional enforcement power is limited to the Court's
determination of substantive scope of the underlying constitutional provision
being enforced.' RFRA, the Archbishop concluded, was not a threat to the
separation of powers because it created only a statutory right, and does not
represent any erosion of Smith's value as a constitutional precedent. The
unfortunate use of the word "Restoration" in the act's title, the recitation of
specific cases in RFRA' findings section and virulent congressional rhetoric
about "overturning" Smith did not indicate that Congress was intruding upon
judicial territory with RFRA.m
213. Id. at *29-*30.
214. Id. at *30.
215. Id. at *31-*32.
216. Id. at *32.
217. Id. at *36.
218. Id. at *37-*42.
219. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 Howard) 393 (1857).
220. Brief of Respondent Flores at *40, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 10293.
221. Id. at *43.
222. Id.
223. Id. at *44-*45.
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Flores' fourth primary defense for RFRA was an answer to the City of
Boerne's establishment of religion argument m The Archbishop observed the
surreal nature of the RFRA dispute by noting that the usual champions of
strict church-state separation were amici aligned against the City. Flores
interpreted that fact to indicate a total lack of merit to Boerne's Lemon test
violation analysis." Advancement of religious liberty is not advancement
of religion, nor is it an endorsement of religion over non-religion.' Nor
would RFRA require excessive entanglement by forcing any government
entity to keep track of any religious practice, but rather functions as a
statutory protection from the establishment of religion. 7
The Archbishop's final major defense of RFRA was that the respondent's
view of congressional enforcement power actually represents "part of the
genius of separation of powers."m Allowing Congress power to statutorily
remedy constitutional violations when the judiciary cannot or will not
strengthens protection for liberty by removing its protection from monopoly
protection by a single branch of government. Requiring cooperation of
multiple branches to curtail liberty prevents any single branch from destroying
liberty."9 The Archbishop's brief concluded by mildly scolding the Smith
Court for its majoritarian impulse.
The United States intervened on behalf of the Church to support RFRA as
a valid exercise of congressional enforcement power. The U.S. advanced four
primay defenses of the statute. The Government's first argument was that
RFRA was fully within delegated congressional authority under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.m Sensing potential danger to key voting rights
precedents, the Government contended that the Court should not reconsider
Morgan."' Responding to the City of Boerne's objection to reading Morgan
as authority for the substantive power theory, the Government reminded the
Court that the potentially troublesome language was only in a footnote and
was not essential to the decision." Furthermore, RFRA did not specifically
conflict by design with any particular state or local law. The U.S. also urged
the Court to reject any challenge to RFRA on the basis that layered judicial
224. Id. at *45-*48. The City's argument is summarized at supra notes 154-90.
225. Brief of Respondent Flores at *45-*46, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 10293. Flores
noted that the Americans United for Separation of Church and State, the American Civil Liberties
Union, People for the American Way, the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish
Congress, and the Anti-Defamation League signed onto the Coalition for Free Exercise of
Religion's brief in support of the Respondents. Id. at *46 n.15.
226. ILd. at *46-*47.
227. Id. at *48.
2281. Id.
229. 1d. at *48-*49.
230. Brief for the United States at *9, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 13201.
231. Id.
232. Id. at * 11; see supra note 177 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n, 10
(1966)).
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and legislative protections for free exercise violated the Constitution. 3 The
Government claimed that the Fourteenth Amendment's legislative history and
construction supported the layered view.'
The Government continued its Section 5 analysis by asserting that RFRA
is "appropriate" enforcement legislation. 5 The U.S. argued that RFRA
statutorily enforced both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses,'
and that the law was plainly adapted to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's
Free Exercise guarantee, as an incorporated component of "liberty" after
Cantwell v. Connecticut.'r RFRA deterred governmental free exercise
infringements through ostensibly neutral actions, protected minority
faiths," and expanded protection beyond the constitutional minimum to
limit substantial burdens which, by effect, obstruct religious practices.2"
The Government's second primary defense of RFRA addressed the
separation of powers issue. Denying the City's judicial infringement theory,
the U.S. agreed with the Archbishop that RFRA created only a distinct
statutory right."m The Government further maintained that separation of
powers actually permits Congress to statutorily reimpose a level of scrutiny
greater than the constitutional baseline.'4
The Government's final two arguments responded to specific Boerne
attacks. The U.S. disputed Boerne's friendless Establishment Clause argument,
urging the Court to reject the City's general endorsement theory.4 3
Attempting to avoid a result similar to its recent defeat in United States v.
Lopez," the Government vigorously defended RFRA as consistent with
federalism.2" First, the U.S. observed that RFRA was actually more
responsive to federalism principles than previously upheld legislation enacted
under Section 5' The Government reasoned that the failure of the
233. Brief for the United States at *11-*17, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 13201.
234. d.
235. ld. at *17-*35.
236. d. at *18-*25.
237. h. at *26-*28; see Cantwell v. Connecticut 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (incorporation
against the states).
238. Brief for the United States at *28, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 13201.
239. Id. at *29 (citing congressional testimony about Smith's impact on minority religious
groups including: Amish, the Hmongs' exercise of animism, Jews, Mormons, Muslims, Native
Americans, Quakers).
240. Id. at *32-*35.
241. Id. at *36.
242. Id. at *37-*40.
243. I14 at *40-*44.
244. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (striking down a federal "gun-free school zones" law as beyond
congressional power under the Commerce Clause).
245. Brief for the United States at *44-*49, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 13201.
246. Id. at *44; see also id. at *46 n.49. ('RFRA's balancing test pales in comparison to the
breadth and depth of intrusion on States' autonomy accomplished by the Voting Rights Act and
Civil Rights Acts.")
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Constitution to specifically assign zoning and religious regulation to state
governments means that RFRA implicated only general state power, which is
completely subject to the Fourteenth Amendment's congressional enforcement
power u4 Consequently, the principles of federalism embodied in the Tenth
Amendment do not protect state authority from RFRA because Congress acted
within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. Citing several cases including
EEOC v. Wyoming, Seminole Tribe v. Florida,"9 and Gregory v.
Ashcroft, the Government distinguished a broad grant of enforcement
power to Congress under the Fourteenth Amendment from the narrower
delegation in the Commerce Clause.
The U.S. continued its federalism argument by positing that RFRA
functions only as a reasonable federal standard with only a limited effect on
state power and preservative of each state's independent policy judgments. 2
Furthermore, RFRA could only be implicated when a state's exercise of power
created a substantial burden on a claimant's free exercise rights, but the state
could avoid granting an exception to a narrowly tailored law supporting a
compelling interest. 3 The Government distinguished New York v. United
States,2M arguing that the waste disposal statute was unlike RFRA because
it flowed from the more limited Commerce Clause and it directly required the
states to enforce federal regulations. By comparison, RFRA only established
federal norms similar to other regulatory statutes." RFRA also applied
equally to all levels and branches of government, unlike the statute in New
York v. United States, protecting against power centralization and offloading
of regulatory costs.' Finally, the U.S. concluded that: "'[T]he Constitution
divides authority between federal and state governments for the protection of
individuals."'" The Government's argument implies that protecting
federalism at the expense of religious liberty would be an exercise in empty
formalism, contrary to the doctrine's raison d'etre.
Less than one month before oral arguments in Boerne, the Ninth Circuit
ruled in Mockaitis v. Harcleroad that, under the Court's interpretation in
247. Id. at *45.
248. 460 U.S. 226, 239-42, 243 n.18 (1983) ("[W]hen properly exercising its power under
§ 5, Congress is not limited by the same Tenth Amendment constraints that circumscribe the
exercise of its Commerce Clause powers.").
249. 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1125 (1996).
250. 501 U.S. 452, 468 (1991) (arguing that federalism principles "are attenuated when
Congress acts pursuant to its powers to enforce the Civil War Amendments")
251. Brief for the United States at *45 n.46, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 13201.
252. Id. at *46.
253. d.
254. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
255. Brief for the United States at *47, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 13201 (comparing
RFRA to Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Voting Rights Acts).
256.. Id. at *48-*49.
257. Id. at *49 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 181).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol23/iss2/3
BOERNE V. FLORES WRECKS RFRA
Morgan, RFRA was a valid exercise of congressional enforcement power
granted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth AmendmentY8 The City of
Boerne filed a reply brief to, among other argument, dispute this holding. 9
The City began its response by asserting that RFRA redefines the meaning of
the Free Exercise clause in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
Boerne observed that the separation of powers protects not only individual
rights but also state power. The statutory rights theories, whether layering
or ratcheting greater protection onto the Free Exercise Clause requirement,
were actually a thin veil for evasion of the Court's constitutional
interpretation."' Boerne compared the limited anecdotal evidence compiled in
the congressional hearings to judicial fact finding and argued that it was vastly
out of proportion to RFRA's sweeping nature and was a further indicator of
impermissible intent.' Furthermore RFRA failed to only restore the pre-
Smith version of the Sherbert-Yoder test, but it vastly expanded mandatory
strict scrutiny analysis to an extent greater than in any other First Amendment
clause.'
The City then rebutted Mockaitis' and the Archbishop's Section 5
interpretations. Boerne claimed that the post hoe defense of RFRA as
analogous to valid Equal Protection Clause enforcement statutes was a pretext
because RFRA failed to outlaw discrimination against any suspect class, nor
did RFRA even use similar statutory language. RFRA also was not
analogous to effects test-type anti-discrimination laws. Grouping all the
Archbishop's examples of laws which dispensed with the necessity of finding
overt discrimination, Boerne distinguished them, claiming that these law were
within Morgan's first holding that Congress can use its factfinding ability to
discover and outlaw specific acts which ultimate lead to constitutional
violations.' RFRA, in comparison, established only a judicially applied test,
redefining not the means of constitutional protection, but the ends of such
protection.' Boerne also rebutted the alarmist argument that overturning
RFRA was tantamount to undermining all statutes relying on Section 5's
delegation to Congress. Distinguishing narrow prophylactic statutes supported
by specific discrimination findings from the broad scope of RFRA, the City
reasoned that:
258. 104 F.3d 1522, 1529 (1997).
259. Reply Brief of Petitioner City of Boerne, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 53105.
260. Id. at *1.
261. Id. at *2.
262. Id. at *3 n.1.
263. Id. at *4-*5.
264. Id. at *5-'10.
265. Id. at *10-*13.
266. Id. at *11.
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This Court's expansive reading of congressional power vis-a-vis
the Equal Protection Clause should be the zenith of congressional!
authority, however, not the springboard for ever-expansive federal
power. Thus, the Voting Rights Act and Title VII can stand as
exercises of prophylactic power, but RFRA must fall as a statute
that enforces no constitutional guarantees but rather attempts to
recast such guarantees" 7
The City then urged the Court to reject the apologists' view that Section 5
created congressional power to determine the Constitution's' substantive
scope.'
Attempting to breathe life into the Establishment Clause argument, Boerne
responded that RFRA required government to investigate the theology and
practices of every locally practiced religion, leading to unconstitutional
entanglements' Both to avoid RFRA litigation claims and to comply with
the sweeping scope of RFRA as applied to all levels of government, local
governments could not risk waiting for the natural emergence of RFRA
claims, but must proactively determine which statutes, ordinances or policies
might have an unlawful effect on religious practices. Waiting for claims to
arise could cause a state actor to fall within Prevailing Party status under a
federal attorney's fees statute, substantially raising the risk level for
government challenges to violators of facially neutral laws.!
Finally, Boerne replied to the contradictory chorus of historical analysts
fighting"' over whether individual, court-ordered religious exemptions were
originally intended by the First Amendment's drafters, suggesting that these
histories were irrelevant to deciding RFRA's constitutionality'm The framers
would not have considered any legislation concerning religion within the
power of Congress. Boerne cited Federalist opposition to the Bill of Rights
and noted Alexander Hamilton's reluctant acquiescence to drafting the First
Amendment as support for their originalist position.m
B. Battle of the Amici
When the court considered Smith, only four interest groups filed amicus
curiae briefs."4 But when the court granted certiorari to Boerne, the interest
267. Id. at *14 (emphasis added).
263. Id. at *15-*16.
269. Ld. at *17.
27,0. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1994)).
271. Id. at *17 (comparing McConnell, Origins, supra note 32, at 1420, to Hamburger, supra
note 61, at 947-48).
272. Id. at *18-*19.
273. Id.
274. Beeson, supra note 63, at 1172. The briefs filed by the American Jewish Congress, the
American Civil Liberties Union, and the Association on Indian Affairs argued the specific details
of peyotism, seeking to prove that the burden on the Native American Church practice was not
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level soared. In addition to the briefs filed by the parties, twenty-five amici
curiae briefs were filed.' The briefs represent an amazingly wide range of
special interests concerned with RFRA's survival or demise. Several friends
of the Court urged the Justices to view Boerne as an opportunity to discard
Smith. Other amici urged various theories under which the Court could uphold
RFRA's constitutionality. Many amici battled RFRA issues among themselves
that were completely unrelated to Boerne's actual fact pattern. And a majority
of the briefs made policy arguments about RFRA, realizing that the Court
might search for a constitutional rationale only after determining a desired
result.
The largest category of amici were religious interest groups. Predictably,
all of these briefs supported Archbishop Flores. The unlikely and
theologically diverse group of religious organizations, known formally as the
Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion, argued in defense of their
legislative accomplishment. 6 The Coalition argued for an accommodationist
outweighed by any compelling interest claimed by Oregon. The Council on Religious Freedom
also filed a brief in the case. Id.
275. See Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2160. The author estimates the total number of pages in the
29 briefs filed, including the four briefs of the parties, at 585-600 pages. Interestingly, Justices
O'Connor and Breyer wrote that the Court should direct the parties to brief whether Smith was
correctly decided. Id at 2176, 2185. A cynical view of this argument is that O'Connor and
Breyer are somewhat disingenuous on the briefing issue given the enormous volume of scholarly
commentary and amici addressing that specific issue. The Justices may be using the argument
to further emphasize their criticism that the Smith Court decided the facially neutral law rule
without briefs or argument on the issue. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 571-72 (1993); Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2186.
276. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion in Support
of Respondents, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 10286. The coalition listed 75 supporting
organizations: Agudath Israel of America; Aleph Institute; American Association of Christian
Schools; American Baptist Churches USA; American Civil Liberties Union; American Conference
on Religious Movements; American Ethical Union; Washington Ethical Action Office; American
Humanist Association; American Jewish Committee; American Jewish Congress; American
Muslim Council; Americans for Democratic Action; Americans for Religious Liberty; Americans
United for Separation of Church & State; Anti-Defamation League; Association of Christian
Schools International; Association on American Indian Affairs; Baptist Joint Committee on Public
Affairs; B'nai B'rith; Central Conference of American Rabbis; Christian Church (Disciples of
Christ); Christian Life Commission, Southern Baptist Convention (Renamed Ethics and Religious
Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention during the pendency of the case);
Christian Science Committee on Publication;. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; Church
of the Brethren; Church of Scientology International; Coalition for Christian Colleges and
Universities; Coalitions for America; Concerned Women for America; Council of Jewish
Federations; Council on Religious Freedom; Council on Spiritual Practices; Criminal Justice
Policy Foundation; Episcopal Church; Evangelical Lutheran Church In America; Federation of
Reconstructionist Congregations and Havurot; Friends Committee on National Legislation;
General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists; Guru Gobind Singh Foundation; Hadassah, the
Women's Zionist Organization of America, Inc.; Home School Legal Defense Association;
International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists; International Institute for Religious
Freedom; Japanese American Citizens League; Jewish Reconstructionist Federation; Justice
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position on the issue of whether RFRA violated the establishment clause.'
They also recited the conventional defense of congressional power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth AmendmentY But the Coalition's separation of
powers argument featured an analysis which did not become an issue in the
final decision. Citing an 1872 case, Ex Parte Klein,' which held that
Congress cannot impose a rule of decision on the courts, the Coalition
distinguished RFRA, positing that Klein does not prohibit legislative
standards. RFRA's application to all governmental actors, not just judges,
transformed RFRA into a legislative standard," not unlike Title VUI."'
The National Jewish Commission on Law hnd Public Affairs (COLPA)
argued in their brief that the First Amendment "impliedly" grants plenary
power to Congress, based on the disjunctive structure of the religion
clauses.' COLPA suggested that the verb "prohibiting" in the free exercise
clause implies that Congress may enact laws which protect religious
freedom.z' Yet the brief candidly admits no direct authority exists for this
interpretive innovation.'
Other briefs in the religious amici category were filed by groups wanting
to remind the Court of particularized free exercise issues. The Mormon
Church's brief recounted the cult's history of persecution before the Fourteenth
Amendment, much of which resulted from majoritarian prejudice in applying
Fellowship Liberty Counsel; Mennonite Central Committee U.S.; Muslim Prison Foundation;
Mystic Temple of Light, Inc.; National Association of Evangelicals; National Campaign for a
Peace Tax Fund; National Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty; National
Council of Churches of Christ in the USA; National Council of Jewish Women; National
Federatfon of Temple Sisterhoods; National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs;
National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council; National Sikh Center; Native American
Church of North America; Native American Rights Fund; North American Council for Muslim
Women; People For the American Way Action Fund; Peyote Way Church of God; Presbyterian
Church (USA), Washington Office; Rabbinical Council of America; Sacred Sites Inter-faith
Alliane; Soka-Gakkal International-USA; Traditional Values Coalition; Union of American
Hebrew Congregations; Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America; Unitarian
Universalist Association of Congregations; United Church of Christ, Office for Church in Society;
United Methodist Church, Board of Church & Society; United Synagogue of Conservative
Judaism.
277. Id. at *3-*13.
278. I. at *13-*24.
279. 13 Wall. 128 (1872). Klein was the basis for a lower court ruling against RFRA. See
Keeler v. Mayor & City of Cumberland, 928 F. Supp 591 (D. Md. 1996).
280. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion in Support of
Respondents at *26-*27, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 10286.
281. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
282. Brief of the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs, Boerne (No. 95-
2074), 1997 WL 9092.
283. I& at *7-*8.
284. 1& at *8. COLPA advocated an analogous interpretation from Congress' power to set
writ of habeas corpus standards, recognized by Justice Story in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet.
(41 U.S.) 539, 619 (1842) (inferring power from U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9).
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superficially neutral laws. The Mormons also suggested that Congress has
authority to correct a "growing secularist bias that distorts governmental
neutrality."'  The National Committee for Amish Religious Freedom
advocated a return to Wisconsin v. Yoder, focusing on the importance of
Yoder to Amish education and as underlying the development of RFRA's
compelling interest test.'
Other religious interests filed separate briefs as well. Two religious liberty
legal defense groups filed amicus briefs analyzing different facets of the
dispute. The American Center for Law and Justice brief focused on the
Establishment Clause issue.' The Rutherford Institute, however, bypassed
defending RFRA, directly asking the Court to reconsider Smith.' Professor
McConnell's historical research on original intent and early interpretations of
both the Free Exercise Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment was recycled
into an amicus brief written for a temporary alliance that linked modern
branches of some Christian sects formally separated since the Schism of 1054
and the Diet of Worms."0 A brief filed by the Knights of Columbus
provided additional Catholic support for Archbishop Flores, arguing that
RFRA was a permissible accommodation of religious exercise that
legislatively grants protection greater than Smith's minimum threshold."9 '
A second category of amici were groups interested in the land use
implications of Boerne. Supporting the City's position, a group including the
National Alliance of Preservation Commissions submitted a brief arguing that
RFRA would likely inhibit efforts to preserve historic churches.' The
National Trust For Historic Preservation's brief supporting the City offered the
Court a tactical escape from the constitutional question. The National Trust
suggested that the Court ought to determine ,*hether RFRA was even
triggered before proceeding to the statute's constitutionality.' 3 The National
285. Brief of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997
WL 10290; see supra notes 34-46 (discussion of Mormon history).
286. Brief of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints at *21-*28.
287. Brief of the National Committee for Amish Religious Freedom, Boerne (No. 95-2074),
1996 WL 744850. The Committee noted, however, that none of its members am actually Amish.
Id. at *1.
288. Brief for Amicus Curiae American Center for Law and Justice, Boerne (No. 95-2074),
1997 WL 7579.
289. Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Rutherford Institute, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL
79286.
290. Brief for the United States Catholic Conference, The Evangelical Lutheran Church in
America, The Orthodox Church in America, and The Evangelical Covenant Church, Boerne (No.
95-2074), 1997 WL 9100.
291. Brief of the Knights of Columbus, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 10270.
292. Brief of the San Antonio Conservation Society, The Municipal Art Society and the
National Alliance of Preservation Commissions, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1996 WL 689741
(following the conventional anti-RFRA analysis on federalism, the Fourteenth Amendment and
Morgan).
293. Brief of the National Trust For Historic Preservation at *8, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1996
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Trust then encouraged the Court to find that denial of a demolition permit was
not a substantial burden on the Church's free exercise right because it did not
punish or coerce conduct.' Supporting the Archbishop, a diverse group of
activist organizations collectively known as the Defenders of Property
Rights' urged the Court to employ the property rights nexus analysis
announced Nollan v. Califomia Coastal Commission' instead of RFRA's
higher compelling interest standard.' The Defenders' brief also contended
that historic preservation was not a compelling state interest and that banning
demolition was not the least restrictive means of achieving preservation.29
A third category of amici fought over whether the Court ought to revisit
Morgan. The Clarendon Foundation submitted a brief on the side of the
City but advocated a far more radical solution to Justice Brennan's broad
musings on Section 5.' Clarendon posited that Morgan is inconsistent with
both the history and the text of the Fourteenth Amendment and ripe for
overruling." The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund responded
by filing a brief defending both RFRA and Morgan.' The NAACP attacked
the "overturn Morgan" idea as a drastic, unwarranted solution which could
limit congressional attempts to protect basic civil rights and pled with the
Court that Morgan "ought not lightly be scuttled."' The Becket Fund for
WL 686194.
294. Id. at *11-*20.
295. Brief of the Defenders of Property Rights, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 9079. The
Defenders include Alabama Family Alliance, American Homeowners Foundation, American Land
Rights Association, American Loggers Solidarity, Americans for Tax Reform, Citizens Against
Repressive Zoning, Citizens for Constitutional Property Rights, Inc., Citizens for Private Property
Rights, Inc., Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow, Conservative Caucus, Inc., Davis
Mountains Trans-Pecos Heritage Association, Environmental Conservation Organization, Frontiers
of Freedom Institute, the Heartland Institute, Hill Country Heritage Association, Hill Country
Landowners' Coalition, Independence Institute, Individual Rights Foundation, Land Rights
Foundation, Maine Conservation Rights Institute, National Center for Public Policy Analysis,
National Center for Public Policy Research, New Hampshire Landowners Alliance, Northwest
Legal Foundation, Pennsylvania Landowners' Association, People for the West! Accord Chapter,
Putting People First, Stop Taking Our Property, Take Back Arkansas, Inc., Texas Public Policy
Foundation, Trans Texas Heritage Association, and United States Business and Industrial Council.
296. 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that to survive Fifth Amendment taking analysis, an
ordinance which affects private property must substantially advance a legitimate governmental
purpose, and there must be a reasonable nexus between the benefit and the burden on the
property); see REYNOLDS, supra note 28, § 125, at 97-98 (Supp. 1996) (bibliography on Nollan).
297. Brief of the Defenders of Property Rights at *14-*18, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL
9079.
298. Id. at *23-*28.
299. Brief of the Clarendon Foundation, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1996 WL 686217.
300. Discussed supra notes 177-78.
301. Brief of the Clarendon Foundation at *5-*20, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1996 WL 686217.
302. Brief of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997
WL 9083.
303. Id. at *2.
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Religious Liberty filed a brief specifically and expressly to rebut Clarendon's
historical arguments. Becket claimed that the original understanding of
Section 5 was at a minimum as broad as Brennan's formulation in
Morgan.
A collateral skirmish over RFRA's impact on prisoners' rights litigation
concerned various amici in a fourth category of briefs submitted to the Court.
Twelve states and three territories joined with Ohio to inform the Court of
RFRA-induced hardships in prison operations, as well as in education,
criminal law enforcement and other traditional state expressions of the police
power.' Although arguing a conventional narrow-scope Section 5 theory,
the Thirteen States' brief warned the Court that upholding RFRA would
undermine federalism by vesting unlimited power in the federal
government." The Thirteen States analysis preserved Morgan, limiting it
to a prohibition of specific laws used in the past to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.' The United States directly responded to several factual
assertions made by the Thirteen States. The U.S. replied that Congress had
extensively debated the prisoner religious claims issue and intended for the
courts to continue reasonably deferring to state and local, prison policies.'
Challenging the states' claims on the adverse effects of RFRA, the
Government noted that the states lost only three of eighty-five RFRA prison
cases that had gone to final judgment.' The Government also argued that
the increase in prisoner litigation was not unique to RFRA because the trend
actually started after Smith and most prisoner claims have multiple bases,
including RFRA Finally, the Government noted that Congress had recently
passed legislation to curb frivolous prisoner lawsuits."'
Three other amici opposed the Thirteen States' conclusions about RFRA.
Four northeastern states filed a brief, arguing that RFRA, if properly
interpreted, has not and will not impair prison administration, education or
public safety 2  A group of Family Policy Councils claimed in their brief
304. Brief of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 9090.
305. Brief for [Thirteen] Amici States in Support of Petitioner at *1-*7, Boerne (No. 95-
2074), 1996 WL 695519. Ohio State Solicitor Jeffrey S. Sutton also appeared at oral argument
in support of Petitioner. Transcript of Oral Argument at *20-*33, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997
WL 87109. The alleged explosion in prisoner claims is discussed supra notes 131-34.
306. Brief for [Thirteen] Amici States in Support of Petitioner at *26-*29, Boerne (No. 95-
2074), 1996 WL 695519.
307. Id. at *7-*8.
308. Brief for the United States at *47 n.50, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 13201.
309. Id. (citing a Westlaw survey performed in preparation of the U.S. brief).
310. Id. The brief also noted that "[p]risoner religious exercise suits were less than 1 percent
of all prisoner civil rights cases in Ohio when RFRA's higher standard of review was in force."
Id. (citation omitted).
311. Id. (citing the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, Tit. VIII,
§ 803(d), 110 Stat. 1321-66, 1321-71 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 1997e (Supp. 11 1996)).
312. Brief of Four States in Support of Respondent at *6-*24, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997
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that the Thirteen States had distorted RFRA case law to falsely claim
intrusions into state authority on home and public education, as well as on
traffic and hunting laws."' Prison Fellowship Ministries and the Aleph
Institute (PFM-AI) filed a brief, supporting RFRA as actually beneficial to
securing prisoner religious rights. 14 The PFM-AI brief attempted to
convince the Court that prisoner religious free exercise helped rehabilitate
inmates and reduce recidivism.3 " Perhaps to distract or placate the Court
from RfRA's incendiary, anti-Smith legislative history, PFM-AI creatively
proposed that RFRA complements Smith. This theory divides the field between
four situations in which Smith requires "exacting scrutiny,"6 and situations
involving a facially neutral law of general applicability, which trigger RFRA's
higher substantial burden threshold before applying strict scrutiny-"7
Notwithstanding that a literal reading of RFRA explicitly contradicts the PFM-
AI complementary protection hypothesis1 " the distinction would only apply
in unusual cases of less-than-substantial intentional or overt burdens on free
exercise. Thus, PFM-AI's complementary protection analysis substantively
added only alternative terminology to the various statutory right justifications
for RFRA, but unsuccessfully attempted the affective purpose of providing
institutional cover had the Court decided to back down from its duel with
Congress.
Prodding the confrontation were some amici in the fifth group, which
consisted of legislative and legal supporters of RFRA. A predominantly
Democratic group of Senators and Congressmen filed an amicus brief which
first sought to remind the Court of the post-Smith assault on the religious
WL 10282. The four amici states were Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, and New York.
The Four States brief took a similar position to the U.S.: RFRA requires substantial deference to
the state,; on matters of prison operation and recognize prison discipline, order and security as
necessary and compelling state interests.
313. Brief of Family Councils, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 9086. The Family Councils
were: Minnesota Family Council, Illinois Family Institute, Indiana Family Institute, Massachusetts
Family Institute, New Jersey Family Policy Council, North Carolina Family Policy Council,
Oklahoma Family Policy Council, Oregon Center for Family Policy, Palmetto Family Council,
Pennsylvania Family Institute, Rocky Mountain Family Council, Rocky Mountain Family Legal
Foundation and Northstar Legal Center.
314. Brief of Prison Fellowship Ministries and the Aleph Institute, Boerne (No. 95-2074),
1997 WL 10274.
315. Id at *10-*12.
316. I.e., Direct targeting, selective burdens, individual exemptions, and hybrid claims. Id.
at *24-*25.
317. Id at *26-*28.
318. See supra notes 84-89. In the findings section, Congress determines that, in general,
govemmsnt should not "substantially burden" religious practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(3) (1994).
In the purpose section, Congress intends for RFRA apply in "all cases," and does not expressly
limit the statute to situations outside of Smith. Id. § 2000bb(b)(1). And in the operative clause,
RFRA applies "even if" the law in question is a facially neutral governmental act of general
applicability. Id. § 2000bb-l(a).
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liberty reported in the RFRA hearings, and to trumpet to the Court that
Congress acted to protect religious freedom."9 The Democratic brief argued
the conventional pro-RFRA position on Morgan, and Section 5 power, clearly
disclaiming that RFRA was anything other than a prophylactic statutory right
supporting a fundamental freedom.3" The Democrats pointed out that under
Lopez, no findings were necessary but that both houses of Congress had
compiled a persuasive record supporting the need for RFRA anyway. 2'
In contrast, the amicus brief submitted by a group of predominantly
Republican members of Congress did not tweak the Court by reciting pages
of post-Smith political grandstanding. The Republican brief sought to provide
the Court with a narrow rationale for RFRA under Section 5 and to condemn
Brennan's substantive theory in Morgan?' The Republicans argued that
Section 5's "appropriate" legislation standard is rooted in the Justice Marshall's
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause in McCulloch
v.MarylandO "Appropriate" legislation, under this theory, means "plainly
adapted" to "legitimate constitutional ends," such that the laws "directly and
necessary tend to produce the end in question." This formula allows Congress
more latitude than merely defining "appropriate" as "indispensably
necessary." Yet the Fourteenth Amendment's Section 5 power is limited to
enforcing guarantees found in the Constitution" RFRA, according to the
Republican amici, fell within the narrow limits of Section 5 and was
319. Brief of Senator Edward M. Kennedy et al., Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 9077.
The Democrats' brief recited some of the more dramatic and potentially inflammatory quotations
from the hearings, including the following:
"Since Smith was decided, governments throughout the U.S. have run roughshod over
religious conviction. [Iln time, every religion in America will suffer." Id. at *3-*4 (quoting
Reverend Oliver S. Thomas, S. REP. No. 103-111, at 7 (1993)).
"[A) Minnesota trial judge... remark[edl that churches have no more constitutional rights
than adult movie theaters." Id. at *4 (quoting 139 CONG. REc. H2356, H2361 (daily ed. May 11,
1993)).
"The parade of horribles [has] already begun." Id. (quoting Rep. Charles Schumer, 139 CONG.
REc. H2356, H2360 (daily ed. May 11, 1993)).
320. Id. at *8-*18.
321. Id at *15 n.14.
322. Brief of Senator Orrin G. Hatchet al. at *1-*4, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 10291.
323. lIa at *11-*13 (examining McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
The McCulloch test is discussed at supra note 168-69. The Republicans note that following
McCulloch the Necessary and Proper Clause was read more narrowly than in recent decisions.
Brief of Senator Orrin G. Hatch et al. at *13 n.6, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 10291.
324. Brief of Senator Orrin G. Hatch et al. at *12-*13, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL
10291.
325. Id. at *20-*24. The Republicans concluded that section 5 does not empower Congress
to enforce rights not encompassed in the amendment, adopt remedies insufficiently related to a
protected right, regulate solely private conduct, infringe on the Eleventh Amendment protection
for state interests without a clearly expressed intent, or to otherwise violate the Constitution. Id
The amici specifically reject any penumbrae theories of implied rights as creations of the non-
original twentieth-century creations. Id. at *20.
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appropriate enforcement legislation because of a need to provide for
deterrence against superficially neutral laws3' and for remediation without
requiring claimants to establish a discriminatory motive for the state action in
question.3"
Two other amici in this group sought to preserve the federal role
represented by RFRA but for different reasons. A group of Virginia
legislators filed an amicus brief, recounting to the Court the Commonwealth's
historic commitment to religious liberty and the central role of favorite son
and founding father Thomas Jefferson as an advocate for religious
freedom.3" The Virginians then informed the Court that state legislatures are
ill-suited for the task of carving out exceptions for minority religious practice.
Accordingly, a federally imposed rule which returns exception determinations
to the judiciary actually assists state legislatures!" The American Bar
Association also filed an brief in support of the Archbishop's position. The
ABA focused on the risk that finding RFRA unconstitutional might pose to
the constitutional basis of other federal civil and individual rights statutes
theoretically flowing from the font of Section 5.3'-
The sixth group of amici was a miscellaneous collection of special interest
groups and a neutral individual. Supporting the City's position, the American
Professional Society on the Abuse of Children (APSAC) and Children's
Healthcare is a Legal Duty (CHILD) opposed RFRA as "ratcheting down" due
process and equal protection by subordinating the interests of all persons, but
most importantly children, to religious interests.3 ' APSAC and CHILD also
contended that RFRA's least restrictive means test undermines federalism by
preventing states from adopting cumulative remedies, and it has skewed
Establishment Clause jurisprudence."2 The National Right to Work Defense
Foundation, in contrast, supported the Archbishop but opposed retaining
RFRA, advocating instead reversal of the "rootless" Smith decision.33
326. Id at *28.
327. Id at *29-*30.
328. Brief of Members of the Virginia House of Delegates and Senate at *2-*3, Boerne (No.
95-2074), 1997 WL 10275.
329. Id. at *4-*5. Curiously, the brief fails to consider why the states must rely on Congress
and could not themselves enact state RFRAs to obtain these advantages. The only state legislative
remedy considered is drafting specific exceptions to each offending statute. Id.
330. Brief of the American Bar Association, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 9088.
331. Brief of APSAC at *2-*4, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1996 WL 686052.
332. Id. at *5.
333. Brief of the National Right to Work Defense Foundation, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997
WL 9081. The NRTWDF brief contained two memorable passages. First, the amicus speculated
that if Boerne's historic preservation ordinance were in effect, Moses would have been prevented
from destroying the golden calf because of its "architectural, archeological, cultural, social,
economic, ethnic and political history." Id at *3. See generally Exodus 32. And in a passage
sure to be universally hailed by politicians and panned by professors, the brief quoted a decision
discussing an earlier rule as "consistently criticized by commentators," and then the NRTWDF
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Finally, a brief in support of neither party sought to inform the Court that,
unlike freedom of religion, freedom of conscience is not protected by the First
Amendment." Not surprisingly, the Court did not apply this unusual amicus
insight in resolving Boerne.
C. Justice Kennedy's Condemnation: RFRA Exceeds Congress' Fourteenth
Amendment Powers
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy began the destruction of RFRA as
applied to the states by candidly observing an obvious fact: Congress' intent
was to, in effect, reverse the hated Smith precedent. 35 Kennedy indirectly
responded to Smith's critics by briefly restating the Court's rationale, but
avoided the substance of the protest about the decision's incorrect use of
precedent. The majority opinion simply concluded that Smith was both
methodologically sounder than the hybrid claim compelling interest balancing
cases and within the majority of precedents.3 Kennedy unequivocally
implied that Smith should be viewed as settled law. As far as the Boerne
Court was concerned, neutral, generally applicable laws apply to all persons,
even if they incidently burden actions taken in the name of religion. The free
exercise clause does not require states to demonstrate a compelling interest to
justify such intrusions. 3 The optimal solution hoped for by many of the
amici, correcting the Court's detour away from Sherbert and Yoder, would not
be implemented by this Court.
The dissenters were virtually ignored by Kennedy's opinion. A single
paragraph clinically reported the positions of the four who voted against the
bright line test adopted in Smith.3 Kennedy left the task of rebutting the
deafening chorus of detractors to Scalia.
Telegraphing the Boerne Court's insecurity, if not outrage over the political
firestorm surrounding Smith, the Court acknowledged RFRAs legislative
history and quoted the legislative findings.339 As the Court implied during
the its showdown with Congress over the outer limits of the Commerce
Clause in Lopez, the Court will look seriously at the legislative judgments
when Congress acts near the boundaries of its delegated powers.' Kennedy
made the following application to Smith: "If the views of law professors and law students are
relevant to whether a matter has been wrongly decided, how much more pertinent is the opinion
of Congress, a co-equal branch of government!" Brief of the National Right to Work Defense
Foundation at *5-*6.
334. Brief in Support of Neither Party, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1996 WL 687873.
335. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2160-61.
336. Id. at 2161.
337. Id.
338. Id. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented in Smith. Justice O'Connor
concurred in result.
339. Id.
340. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). However; the argument in Lopez was that Congress provided
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assessed that Smith's congressional unpopularity was the motiye behind
RFRA."4 Then Justice Kennedy quoted the findings section of RFRA, which
states in capsule form Congress' retrospective free exercise clause
interpretation., complete with its mildly inflammatory, blame-assessing
language. 2 The section ends with a summary of the compelling interest test
and RFRA's universal scope.'
The next step in Kennedy's dismantling was to test RFRA's Fourteenth
Amendment roots against the separation of powers doctrine. Invoking the
Court's most sacrosanct cases, McCulloch v. Maryland' and Marbury v.
Madison, 5 the Court reminded Congress that its powers are enumerated and
limited by a written constitution.' RFRA's authority over state governments
hinged on finding it within the enforcement power in Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court recognized three of the respondent
arguments: (1) Congress is only protecting an incorporated liberty interest, the
free exercise of religion, at a higher level than Smith requires; (2) RFRA is
within the Congress' preventative power under Section 5; (3) Section 5 is not
limited to preventative power. 7
The majority opinion then determined the scope of Section 5's positive
legislative power. Admitting that prior cases described the power
expansively,' the majority recalled several statutory examples of legislative
enforcement where Congress prohibited constitutional conduct in a
traditionally state-regulated area to deter or remedy discriminatory effects. 9
But quoting the opinion of Justice Black in Oregon v. Mitchell,'" Kennedy
pronounced that Section 5 does not grant unlimited power to Congress."'
Based on both the structure and text of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
majority unequivocally rejected the substantive power theory:
Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause
cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not
no specific findings on the relationship between the statute and the supporting constitutional
delegation.
341. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2161.
342. ld. "[T]he Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government
justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion .... " 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb(a)(4) (1994).
343. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2162.
344. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
345. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
346. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2162.
347. Id. at 2162-63.
348. Id. at 2163 (citing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)); Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
349. Id. (referencing literacy test bans, federal preclearance of voting plans, medical
prescription of liquor during national prohibition).
350. 400 U.S. 112, 128 (1970).
351. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2163.
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enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has
been given the power "to enforce," not the power to determine
what constitutes a constitutional violation. Were it not so, what
Congress would be enforcing would no longer be, in any
meaningful sense, the "provisions of [the Fourteenth
Amendment]." 3"
Candidly, the majority admits that drawing a line between impermissible
substantive interpretation and allowable preventative or remedial measures is
difficult. But the Court is guided by congruence and proportionality between
the means selected and ends sought by Congress." The majority opinion
undertook a lengthy review of the Fourteenth Amendment's legislative history,
concluding that it supports the remedial theory, not the substantive theory, of
Section 53' Kennedy observed that the first committee draft of the
Fourteenth Amendment, commonly referred to as the Bingham proposal, was
criticized because it allowed Congress to legislate into traditional areas of
state responsibility. The House ultimately tabled the Bingham proposal,
effectively killing it. 5 A subsequent committee draft proposal contained a
self-executing Section 1 and limited Congress to remedial enforcement in
Section 5. After unrelated revisions, the second draft passed the House and
Senate and was ratified by the states, becoming the Fourteenth
Amendment."s A later debate on the Ku Klux Klan Act included statements
which clearly indicate that Congress intended to reject the Bingham
substantive power enforcement provisions.3" Furthermore, the Majority
observed that the Fourteenth Amendment as enacted maintains the traditional
separation of powers between the courts and Congress. During the debate
over the Bingham proposal, several legislators noted that the first draft
diverged from the pattern of self-executing provisions in the Bill of Rights by
giving Congress interpretive power, fundamentally altering the separation of
powers. But the enacted version returned to the court-enforced, self-executing
pattern, creating substantive rights against the states, and by implication
restricting Congress from substantive interpretation." 8
Kennedy turned next to case law supporting the Court's rejection of the
substantive theory and to prove historic acceptance of the remedial and
preventative theories." The Court concluded that the early cases
invalidating the Civil Rights Act of 1875 continue to stand for the integral
352. Id. at 2164 (quoting U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5).
353. Id.
354. Id. at 2164-66.
355. Id. at 2164-65.
356. Id. at 2165.
357. Id. at 2166.
358. Id. at 2166.
359. Id. at 2166-68.
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restriction on congressional enforcement power under Section 5, despite being
substantively overruled in the 1960s.' The Court in contemporary civil
rights cases, including Katzenback v. South Carolina," Oregon v.
Mitchell, City of Rome v. United States, and Katzenback v. Morgan,
has inquired as to whether the ends and means undertaken by Congress under
the color of Section 5 were remedial.'" Kennedy also recognized that the
modern cases failed to support any substantive or non-remedial 'power
theories. The majority opinion specifically rejected Justice Brennan's
unprecedented substantive power speculations in Morgan, reasoning that
interpreting the case as authority for congressional power to expand the
Fourteenth Amendment's catalog of protected rights was "not a necessary
interpretation. . . or even the best one."
The Court concluded its rejection of the substantive power theory by
reasoning that if Congress could expand the substantive scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment, there would be no sustainable limit on congressional
power.' At least seven justices clearly agreed with the conclusion that
Congress lacks substantive power under Section 5. Of the majority, four
justices joined the entire opinion. 7 Justice Scalia joined in all but Justice
Kennedy's legislative history analysis. Justice O'Connor, in dissent, expressly
adopted the majority's conclusions on the remedial scope of Section 5.'
Only Justice Souter and Justice Breyer left room for doubt. Souter's dissent
argued that certiorari was improvidently granted and did not reach the Section
5 question, but resumed his call from Lukumi for a briefing and rearguing of
the Smith rule.'
Coyly, Breyer withheld joining O'Connor's endorsement of the majority's
Section 5 holding, arguing that it was not necessary to reach the question and
vaguely explaining that while he agreed with "some of the views expressed...
I do not necessarily agree with all of them."' But at least for now, the
mysterious thoughts of Breyer and Souter do not matter because Bingham and
Brennan's nightmare of an unrestricted national legislature, ignoring structural
constraints and "enforcing" national solutions to virtually all local problems,
360. Id.
361. 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965).
362. 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (upholding a limited national ban on voter literacy tests and other
specific limits affecting voter registration, but invalidating legislation lowering the minimum
voting age to 18).
363. 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (upholding extension of preclearance for any change to voting
procedures in areas with historic patterns of racial discrimination).
364. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2166-27.
365. Id. at 2168.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 2159 (Rehnquist, Stevens, Thomas, Ginsburg, JJ.).
368. Id. at 2176.
369. Id. at 2186.
370. Id.
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was firmly reinterred into the graveyard of rejected radical reconstructionist
ideas by the Boerne Court.
The Court's apparent consensus, however, unraveled a bit as it considered
whether RFRA was valid Section 5 enforcement legislation. The majority
curtly summarized pages of pro-RFRA rationale into three arguments for the
statute as a remedial and preventative act: First, RFRA reasonably protects
free exercise as defined by Smith; Second, RFRA prevents and remedies
targeting of religious expression; Third, if Congress can prevent racial
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, then it can also promote
religious liberty.'
The majority initially restated that congruence between ends and means
was a touchstone of remedial and preventative-remedial legislation.' r But
in comparing RFRA to the Voting Rights Act, the majority found a key
distinction. Unlike with pervasive racist voting schemes in the 1960s,
Congress found virtually no generally applicable laws that were enacted in
recent decades because of religious prejudice. The anecdotal evidence
harvested from the congressional hearings concerned incidental effects from
the normal operation of from neutral laws. Congress focused on these
incidental consequences during their fact finding, not on the motives, purposes
or objects of the offending government acts." Kennedy, however, admitted
that deference did not turn on the legislative record, "but on due regard for the
decision of the body constitutionally appointed to decide'374
RFRA failed, in the judgment of the majority, to merit deference because
its means were out of proportion with the alleged remedial and preventative-
remedial ends. Unlike other civil rights laws which were enacted to prevent
or respond to demonstrated and likely unconstitutional state action, the Court
determined RFRA was a perpetual, sweeping statute aimed at all laws and
potentially affecting all governmental actions. Returning to the Voting Rights
Act comparison, Kennedy noted that its proportionality was evidenced by its
limited scope, geographic effects and duration. 5
Additionally, the majority flunked RFRA because forcing states to shoulder
the burdensome compelling interest balancing test when defending any law
against a religious liberty claim lacked proportionality and congruence with
any remedial or preventative-remedial objective. Kennedy noted that the
compelling interest test was the most demanding test available in
constitutional law. Furthermore, local governments would be hard pressed to
371. 1, at 2168.
372. 1L at 2169. The Court noted that preventative legislation can at times be acceptably
remedial. Id. Preventative-remedial is a reasonable shorthand for this nexus.
373. AL
374. 1d at 2170 (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 207 (1970) (opinion of Harlan,
J.)).375. 1,d
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prove they were using the least restrictive means to regulate incidentally
burdened religious objectors. To determine whether the required substantial
burden threshold was met, Kennedy reasoned that local governments would
be unable to challenge the claimant under either a sincerity of belief or a
centrality to belief analysis. Thus RFRA would topple scores of valid neutral
laws without any assessment of discriminatory motive. 6 And this excessive
cost would incur, according to Justice Kennedy, without the corresponding
benefit of reducing unconstitutional discrimination. In practice, RFRA would
fail to uncover and neutralize most actual patterns or practices of
unconstitutional religious discrimination. Appraising the statutory substantial
burden test against the orthodox discrimination theories of disparate treatment
and disparate impact, the majority concluded that RFRA would not generally
indicate when religious claimants were subject to greater burden than any
average citizen comparably situated. Kennedy also noted that the least
restrictive means test ratcheted scrutiny higher than the pre-Smith cases,
indicating an inappropriate overbreadth for preventative-remedial
legislation.3 '
Justice Kennedy concluded RFRA's demolition by summarizing the role of
deference in context with the separation of powers. He posited that when
Congress acts within its sphere of constitutionally delegated power, it has a
duty to measure those act against the Constitution using its own institutional
judgment.78 Judicial deference, based on the presumption of validity,
assumes Congress follows this duty to preserve the Constitution.3' Invoking
Marbury v. Madison, Kennedy admonished Congress that:
Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved
best when each part of the government respects both the
Constitution and the proper actions and determinations of the
other branches. When the Court has interpreted the Constitution,
it has acted within the province of the Judicial Branch, which
embraces the duty to say what the law is. When the political
branches of the Government act against the background of a
judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must
be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will
treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled
principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must
be disappointed.3"
And the expectations of Archbishop Flores, the Congress, and a great portion
376. Id. at 2171.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. IM at 2171-72.
380. Id. at 2172 (citation omitted).
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of the amici, apologists and commentators were thus disappointed as the
majority finished leveling RFRA as applied to the states.
D. Stevens Concurring Opinion
But as in many constitutional engagements at the Supreme Court, the
writer for the majority failed to have the last word. Justice Stevens
independently opined in concurrence that RFRA was an unconstitutional
establishment of religion. Reasoning that agnostics and atheists would be
comparatively disadvantaged to the "federal statutory entitlement" RFRA
granted to all churches as a "weapon," Stevens asserted that RFRA amounted
to a governmental preference of religion over irreligion?' Exercising a
Justice's prerogative to ignore contrary authority" and oversimplify issues,
Stevens, of course, made no effort to refute the contrary arguments presented
by the Archbishop,3" the United States,' and a legion of amici. 5
E. O'Connor's Attack on Smith and Scalia's Response
The serious controversy on the Court, however, surrounded the continuing
feud over Smith. Justice O'Connor contended that the majority's condemnation
of RFRA was based on the flawed assumption that Smith established the
correct Free Exercise Clause baseline. She suggested that in order to
determine whether RFRA was within congressional enforcement power, a
proper free exercise rule must first be reestablished." O'Connor repeated
the call for briefing the issue in Smith, echoing a ubiquitous criticism among
the decision's detractors on the Supreme Court." Then O'Connor, armed
with numerous cases, law review articles and historical materials, set out to
attack Smith's legitimacy.' Scalia's response was not far behind.3"
381. Id.
382. See e.g. Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994) (Souter, J.) ("[W]e do not
deny that the Constitution allows the State to accommodate religious needs by alleviating special
burdens. Our cases leave no doubt that in commanding neutrality the Religion Clauses do not
require the government to be oblivious to impositions that legitimate exercises of state power may
place on religious belief and practice.").
383. See Brief of Respondent Flores at *45-*48, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 10293.
384. See Brief for the United States at *40-*44, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 13201.
385. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion in Support
of Respondents at *3-*12, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 10286; Brief for Amicus Curiae
American Center for Law and Justice at *2-*15, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 7579; Brief of
the Knights of Columbus at *5-*17, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 10270. Perhaps Justice
Scalia's response to Justice Stevens in Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994), might also
apply in Boerne as well: "Justice Stevens' statement is less a legal analysis than a manifesto of
secularism. It surpasses mere rejection of accommodation and announces a positive hostility to
religion." I. at 749.
386. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2176.
387. I at 2176-77.
388. I at 2177-85.
389. Actually, Scalia's vote with the majority caused his concurrence responding to
No. 2]
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O'Connor's thesis was that a proper interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause includes more that limiting it to a non-discrimination law aimed at
prohibiting the singling out of religious observance, but rather it is an
affirmative guarantee, insuring the right to exercise religious beliefs without
impen-nissible government intrusions." Under O'Connor's view, the Free
Exercise Clause jurisprudence before Smith established a clear rule that
substantial burdens on religious conduct must be justified by a compelling
state interest and must also be narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling
intere,;0t' Rejection of this rule in Smith, according to O'Connor was not
consistent with either history or precedent.3"
O'Connor then turned to a review of four post-Smith lower court decisions,
arguing that lower court application of the Smith rule damages religious
liberty.3" O'Connor concluded that lower courts "no longer find necessary a
searching judicial inquiry" into reasonable accommodations after Smith.?
O'Connor urged repairing the damage by revisiting Smith, distinguishing her
call from her prior defense of stare decisis in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey95 by noting that Smith is a recent precedent which is inferior to prior
case law and causes results virtually impossible to legislatively correct."
O'Connor then renewed her historical attack on Smith by invoking, but not
restating prior editions of the anti-Smith argument in Smith, Lukumi, and
Professor McConnell's academic commentary."' Responding to these earlier
O'Connor's dissent to be printed first in the Supreme Court Reporter, making it seem somewhat
like a preemptive strike. See id. at 2173-76.
390. Md. at 2176.
391. IM. at 2177 (citing Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Hobble v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987); United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626-29 (1978); Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205,215 (1972); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437,462 (1971); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963)).
392. Id.
393. Id. (citing Yang v. Stumer, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990) (allowing forced autopsy
over Hmong native religious objections); Cornerstone Bible Church v. Hastings, 948 F.2d 464
(8th Cir. 1991) (holding denial of church in a commercial zone did not implicate Free Exercise
Clause); Rector of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991) (finding no Free Exercise claim implicated against facially
neutral landmark preservation law); State v. Herschberger, 462 N.W. 2d 393 (Minn. 1990)
(denying a Free Exercise exemption for an Amish buggy to slow-moving vehicle marking)).
394. Id.
395. 505 U.S. 833, 855-56 (1992). In Casey, O'Connor posited four criteria to justify the
Court in refusing to follow stare decisis: (1) The precedent in question lacks workability; (2)
Reliance on the precedent is not such that a great disruption in the law would occur if the case
is ovenuled; (3) Evolution of a legal principle weakens the doctrinal underpinnings of the
precedent; (4) A change in factual assumptions undermines the precedent. O'Connor rejected
overruling Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in Casey, arguing that recent reliance on legal
abortion weighed against overruling settled precedent. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855-56.
396. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2177-78.
397. Id. at 2178 (citing Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
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attacks, Scalia parenthetically quipped that his opinion in Smith "adequately
answered" this tide of arguments against his use and interpretation of
precedent. He summarily concluded that "[tihe historical evidence marshalled
by the dissent cannot fairly be said to demonstrate the correctness of Smith;
but it is more supportive of that conclusion than destructive of it."39
O'Connor's latest salvo in the historical skirmish did not focus on Scalia's use
of precedent, but rather on examining the early American traditions of free
exercise. O'Connor advanced that the earlier historical evidence was more
consistent with the pre-Smith cases than with Smith, casting doubt on the more
recent holding."' Scalia replied to O'Connor's conclusion that the drafter's
intent for the Free Exercise clause undermined the Smith rule, labeling it an
"extravagant claim," and noting that both pro- and anti-Smith scholars failed
to find conclusive evidence supporting O'Connor's view.
O'Connor's quest for original intent began by observing that the original
draft of the Constitution had no individual liberty safeguards because
Federalists believed them to be superfluous and excessively limiting. She
explained the pressure from Baptists, Antifederalists and Protestant dissenters
led to the inclusion of the Bill of Rights by December 1791 °' Although the
872, 894-901 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 570-71 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring); McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism, supra note 32, at 1120-27).
398. Id. at 2175.
399. Id. at 2178.
400. Md. at 2172-73.
401. Id. at 2178. O'Connor erroneously implies that Baptists are Protestants. In the general
sense that all non-Catholics may be viewed as protesting Papal authority, Justice O'Connor is
correct. However Baptists are historically not Protestants. Protestants trace their linage to the Diet
of Speyer in 1529. Baptists are more accurately classified as part of the Free Church Tradition,
whose origins date from the rejection of Anglican Christianity (including Puritan and Separatist
forms) and the rebaptism of several members by radical Anabaptist sects in Amsterdam in 1609.
See ROBERT A. BAKER, A SUMMARY OF CHRISTIAN HISTORY 237-40 (1959); WILLIAM R. ESTEP,
THE ANABAPTIST STORY 203-30 (1963). But see Baptists, in DICTIONARY OF WESTERN
CHURCHES, supra note 34, at 72 (interpreting the historical evidence as indicating Baptists were
a natural development of English Congregationalism). Adding to the confusion is that many
scholars have not been precise in grouping or consistent in terminology. See TORsTEN BERGSTEN,
BALTHASAR HUBMAIER: ANABAPTIST THEOLOGIAN AND MARTYR 16-18 (Irwin J. Barnes et al.
trans., William R. Estep ed., 1978); DONALD F. DURNBAUGH, THE BELIEVER'S CHURCH: THE
HISTORY AND CHARACTER OF RADICAL PROTESTANTISM 4-33 (1985) (arguing for an expansive
view of the Free Church Tradition in part because the indeterminacy of the label and virtually
universal acceptance of Anabaptist, Baptist and other radical positions on the separation of church
and state). Among the critical distinctions between Protestantism and the Free Church Tradition
are divergent positions on both the free. exercise of religion and the establishment of state
churches. Unique and essential to the Free Churches was advocacy of religious freedom and the
separation of church and state. See ESTEP, supra, at 223-29 (recounting the transmission of
Anabaptist views on religious freedom to early Baptists and their subsequent persecution and
martyrdom at the hands of James I and other English Protestants before the interregnum and the
Acts of Toleration). Even in colonial America, Protestant views often clashed with Free Church
No.:,2]
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Congress nor the states held detailed debates on religious freedom or the Free
Exercise Clause, O'Connor maintained that the historical record indicates a
precise meaning and an intent to guarantee affirmative protection from
government intrusion. O'Connor recited detailed facts in four distinct
categories for support of her affirmative guarantee hypothesis: colonial free
exercise provisions, early state free exercise clauses, legislative
accommodations, and the statements of early leaders. First, O'Connor argued
that the history of dissenters' colonies,' and settlers' agreements' support
the conclusions that several colonies acknowledged religious liberty as
essential, and the government should only interfere with religious free exercise
"only when necessary to protect the civil peace or to prevent
'licentiousness."'0 Second, O'Connor observed that free exercise clauses
were written into every state constitution, except for Connecticut's, by
1789.!' She quoted the constitutional provisions from four states and the
Northwest Territory Ordinance of 1787, concluding that specific exclusions
for breaches of the peace and licentiousness would be irrelevant if the drafters
did not intend accommodation. O'Connor also contended that Virginia's
rejection of toleration and rights language as boundary concepts in favor of
an open freedom of conscience formulation implied that the drafters assumed
a middle ground position, balancing the individual's religious free exercise
liberty against the State's interest.' Third, O'Connor noted that although the
early United States produced few religious liberty conflicts, due in part to a
less intrusive government and religious homogeneity, government
accommodated objectors whenever possible. Citing a number of legislative
allowances, O'Connor inferred that the Court should reasonably presume that
the drafters and ratifiers assumed that the courts would interpret the Free
Exercise Clause to similarly protect religious liberty."" Fourth, O'Connor
quoted various statements of James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, George
Washington, Oliver Ellsworth, Isaac Backus and the Continental Congress to
support her original understanding argument.41 She summarized that these
expressionism. For example, between 1768 and 1777, thirty or more Baptist preachers were
punished, either by incarceration or corporally, in Virginia at the behest of the established,
Protestamt Church of England. ROBERT A. BAKER, A BAPTIST SOURCE BOOK 33 (1966).
402. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2178-79.
403. Id. at 2179-80 (referring to Maryland, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and
Carolina).
404. Id. at 2180 (listing agreements in Carolina, New York, and New Jersey).
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id. (quoting N.Y. CONST. art. XXXVIII (1777); MD. CONsT. DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS art. XXXIII (1776); N.H. CONST. art I, § 5 (1784); GA. CONsT. art. LVI (1777)).
408. id. at 2180-81.
409. Id. at 2181-82.
410. ILd. at 2182-83.
411. Id. at 2183-85.
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four different forms of proof suggest that there is no "one tidy formula," but
that accommodating conflicts with facially neutral, generally applicable laws
would "give meaning to these ideas."4 2
Scalia grouped together O'Connor's first two categories of historical proof
for his response. Initially, he examined the specific provisions quoted by
O'Connor, observing that, despite various constructions and terminology, the
provisions seemed to protect against only targeted or intentional religious
discrimination.4 3 Scalia contrasted facially neutral, generally applicable
laws, arguing that they "would not constitute action taken 'for,' 'in respect of,'
or 'on account of one's religion, or 'discriminatory' action."4 4 Then he
responded that even granting O'Connor's interpretation of the breach of peace
and licentiousness exclusions common to the early constitutions, the clauses
represent generally applicable, facially neutral laws and are consistent with the
Smith rule. Scalia's argument on the exclusions point featured a bit of creative
proof-texting1 5 to broaden the scope of exceptions. Scalia stretched the
concept of peace by citing an eighteenth-century English decision, Queen v.
Lane, for the proposition that "every breach of the law is a breach of the
peace,"4 '6 and a nineteenth-century definition of peace as "public
tranquility."4 7 Scalia consigned his paltry analysis of licentiousness to a
footnote, diluting its meaning to a mere redundancy with a truncated quote
from his nineteenth-century dictionary 1 Additionally, Scalia claimed that
his interpretation of the exclusionary language was consistent with
412. Id. at 2185.
413. Id. at 2173.
414. Id. (quoting early colonial and state free exercise provision language).
415. Proof-texting is a theological term of art for the rhetorical practice of citing to a
specific, isolated passage, such as a verse in the Bible, as authority for the writer's proposition.
As compared to footnoting, proof-texting is a mildly pejorative term when used by liberal and
neo-orthodox theologians to describe the scholastic method of theological conservatives, who,
because of their authoritative view of historic texts, legalistically cite to a text fragment as
authority for virtually every proposition. The affective connotation of the term proof-texting is
that the reciting scholar ought to be suspected of superficially, selectively or conveniently quoting
his fragments of proof out of their original context, and thus extending their meaning beyond, if
not completely outside the fragment's intended scope. Given appropriate philological care,
however, proof-texting is not inherently misleading or facile, but tends to support conservative
results. See BERNARD RAMM, PROTESTANT BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION 175-78 (1970). Legal
arguments often resemble theological disputes, especially in the use of fragmentary support for
often arguable positions. Therefore, proof-texting is a reasonably descriptive term in the legal
context, especially to communicate skepticism about the accuracy of the citation as authority for
the statement at issue.
416. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2173 (quoting Queen v. Lane, 6 Mod. 128, 87 Eng. Rep. 884, 885
(Q.B. 1704)).
417. Id. at 2174 (citing 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 31 (1828)).
418. Id. at 2174 n.l (quoting 2 WEBSTER, supra note 417, at 6). The concept of
licentiousness is discussed infra at notes 482-91.
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contemporaneous political philosophy, which rationalized that freedom was
limited by the law.419 Finally, he concluded that these exclusions fail to
support the compelling interest balancing test.
4
11
Scalia discounted O'Connor's historic accommodation and early leaders"
intent arguments as well. He concluded that the legislative allowances cited
by O'Connor did not prove that the religious exemption concept was
constitutionally mandated under the Free Exercise Clause. Furthermore, Scalia
repeated Smith's political process rationale, arguing that historic legislative
accommodations stood just as well, if not better, for consigning the adjustment
process to the political branches, instead of the courts.42' The judicial
accommodationist position is also undermined by the paucity of early cases.
Only one case before 1850, according to Scalia, can be cited for O'Connor's
position. That case, People v. Phillips, is a flawed precedent because it is
only a New York City municipal court case, was decided by a non-lawyer
mayor, and could have been resolved by invoking common law privilege rules
instead of the Constitution.4 Scalia countered with two early Pennsylvania
cases in support of his conclusion that crafting religious exceptions to neutral,
generally applicable laws ought to be left to the legislature.4 Summarizing
the overall effect of the early leaders' excerpted statements, Scalia reminded
the Court that these quotations were not intended to describe what the
Constitution required under the Free Exercise Clause."4 Scalia specifically
discounted O'Connor's James Madison quotations, observing that Madison
failed to argue that the Virginia religious assessment bill violated the Virginia
Declaration of Rights enacted eight years earlier, but rather relied on a
legislative solution.4 He argued that Thomas Jefferson's free exercise
rhetoric should be contrasted against Jefferson's failure to advocate broad,
affirmative religious accommodation.4  Scalia dismissed George
Washington's accommodationist remarks to Quakers as reflecting
Washington's "wish" and "desire," but not belief about required constitutional
protection."z
Yet the historical volleys of O'Connor and Scalia ultimately meant little to
resolving the conflict at issue in Boerne. Much like the various amici
419. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2174.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 2175 (criticizing People v. Phillips (Ct. Gen. Sess., N.Y.C. 1813), excerpted in
Privileged Communications to Clergymen, I CATH. LAWYER 199 (1955)).
423. Id. (citing Philips v. Gratz, 2 Pen. & W. 412 (Pa. 1831) (holding no continuance for
litigant because the trial fell on his Sabbath day); Stansbury v. Marks, 2 Dall. 213 (Pa. 1793)
(imposing a fine on witness who refused to be sworn on his Sabbath day)).
424. Id. at 2174.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 2175 (citing McConnell, Origins, supra note 32, at 1449-52).
427. Id.
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arguments offered to but not accepted by the Court, the quarrel over Smith's
historicity now has currency only to bloat the pages of scholarly journals with
incessant proof-texting, bold extrapolating, and exegetical parsing of
imprecise, equivocal, ancestral utterances. But the Court, as Justice Kennedy
announced, has determined that Smith is the law. The Anti-Smith contingent
failed, and will likely fall for the foreseeable future to marshal enough votes
for reestablishing the Sherbert-Yoder trend toward judicial accommodation.
However, the debate will rage on without the Court's official participation.
IV. Reactions and Analysis
A. Surveying the Wreckage: Commentary on Boerne
In the opinion of many analysts, the destruction of RFRA reduced the
protection of religious minorities to rubble. Immediate reaction in the
religious community was virtually unanimous in condemning Boerne's result.
For example, Rabbi David Saperstein predicted that "Today's decision in
[Boerne] - the most important church-state case ever to come before the
Supreme Court - will go down in history with Dred Scott and Korematsu,
among the worst mistakes this Court has ever made."" Southern Baptist
ethicist Richard D. Land lamented "The Smith decision was the worst and
most dismaying religious liberty decision handed down by the Supreme Court
in my lifetime. [Boerne] would qualify for the dubious distinction of
dethroning Smith as the worst religious liberty decision of the last fifty
years."4  The Rutherford Institute spokesperson Rita Woltz exclaimed that
the Court "Bulldozed the last barrier of protection for religious Americans"
by returning to the Smith rule which "emasculated the Free Exercise
Clause.""43 "We are now on the verge of true religious apartheid in this
country," Woltz warned.43 Cathy Cleaver, Director of Legal Policy for the
conservative Family Research Council fretted that "The Court is being hostile
to religious freedom by ruling that the state can do whatever it wants, short
of outlawing religion. [I]f [allowing government authorities to veto demolition
and reconstruction of a church building] does not violate the Free Exercise
Clause, nothing does."4 The Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs reacted:
428. Supreme Court Deals Religious Liberty a Devastating Blow, Strikes Down RFRA,
Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism (visited Mar. 17, 1998) <http://www.ednet.com/
RACInews/062597.html> The RAC represents the Union of American Hebrew Congregations and
the Central Conference of American Rabbis. A total of 1.5 million reform Jews are affiliated.
429. Southern Baptist Agency Decries Supreme Court's Actions on RFRA, press release,
Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention (visited Mar. 17,
1998) <http:llwww.serve.comlthecaretakerltextversionltrfa.htm>
430. Rita Woltz, The Rutherford Institute Says Supreme Court Decision Striking Down RFRA
Bodes Illfor Religious Americans, Press Release (visited Mar. 17, 1998) <http://www.serve.comI
thecaretaker/textversion/trfa.htm>
431. Id.
432. Supreme Court Restricts Congress From Protecting Free Exercise of Religion, Press
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"The least dangerous branch" of government has turned out to be
the most dangerous branch for those who value religious freedom.
[T]he Court, with a stroke of a pen, nullified a near unanimous
act of Congress to protect our God-given religious liberty. In
short, our "First Freedom" is not only no longer first, it is barely
a freedom at all."'
Christian Legal Society Center for Law and Religious Freedom director
Steven T. McFarland observed that "[t]he real loser today was our First
Freedom.... Today's ruling threatens bedrock civil rights laws."4
However, all reaction was not unfavorable. For example, the American
Family Association (AFA), a Mississippi-based conservative policy
organization, bucked the negative tide, exclaiming that "[t]he Court's ruling
is not a blow to religious liberty. . . [I]t has reaffirmed the settled
constitutional doctrine that it is the province of the judiciary to say what the
law is."43 The AFA Law Center's Senior Trial Counsel Steve Crampton
commented that "RFRA was a classic case of the ends justifying the means.
Congress in its zeal ... steam rolled through the Constitution, obliterating the
doctrines of separation of powers and federalism."' Commending the
Court's effort to restore constitutional balance, Crampton concluded that
Boerne was one of "those rare occasions were [the Court] got it right. We
cannot allow our commitment to principled constitutional analysis to be
overwhelmed by our frustration with the federal judiciary." '437 AFA Law
Center Litigation Council Brian Fabling agreed, arguing that "religious liberty
can never be said to be advanced when it is sought through the dismantling
of our written constitution."438
Subsequent analysis was perhaps more measured and less quotable, but
remained mostly critical of the decision. For example, Charles Colson,"9
Release of the Family Research Council (visited Mar. 17, 1998) <http://www.abic.org/fre/press/
062597.html>.
433. J. Brent Walker & Melissa Rogers, Statement of Baptist Joint Committee on Public
Affairs, City of Boerne v. Flores (long version) (visited Mar. 3, 1998) <http://www.erolscom/
bjcpalissues/flolong.html>.
434. City of Boerne v. Flores Case Information Page, Christian Legal Society website
(visited Mar. 17, 1998) <http://www.clsnet.comflores>. The Christian Legal Society is an
association of more than 4000 Christian attorneys and law students.
435. Brian Fabling, Supreme Court Strikes Down the Religious Freedoms [sic] Restoration
Act, AFA Action Alert press release (visited Mar. 17, 1998) <http.//www.serve.conthecaretaker/
textversion/trfa.htm>.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Colson, a Nixon Administration official convicted in the Watergate scandal,
subsequently became an evangelical Christian, a vocal prison activist, and a prolific Christian
writer mid broadcaster. See generally LEN COLODNY & ROBERT GETrLIN, SILENT Coup: THE
REmOW.L OFA PRESIDENT 102-06, 113, 130-34, 174-75, 180-201, 241-61, 281, 342, 375 (1991)
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criticizing Justice Scalia's "literalist" legal philosophy and Justice Kennedy's
opposition to "transcendent morality," placed Boerne among a group decisions
trending toward secular majoritarianism and the erasure of moral law as a
source of legislative policy:'
These cases represent a striking departure from the entire history
of Western civilization. Since the ancient Greeks, the law was
understood to be a codification of a people's moral tradition,
resting ultimately on divine law. English common law, which we
inherited, reflects that belief... But this great tradition is now
being abandoned. And Christians are caught in the jaws of a vice:
On one side, conservatives like Justice Scalia say the courts may
not consult morality, that it's up to the people to encode morality
into the law through legislation. Yet in Boerne, the Court denied
the people's right to do just that. On the other side, liberals like
Justice Kennedy say Christian morality may not be encoded into
law because it is nothing but prejudice ......
Colson announced that he and several other Evangelical, Orthodox, and
Roman Catholic leaders had signed a manifesto opposing the Court's hostility
to religious values.M2
A Post-Boeme congressional hearing also resumed a tone similar to pre-
RFRA inquiries. For example, Rabbi Chaim Baruch Rubin attacked Los
Angeles zoning laws:
What do I tell an 84-year old survivor of Auschwitz, a man who
used to risk his life in the concentration camp whenever possible
to gather together a minyan to pray? Do I tell him because he is
old and weak and an amputee, that he must walk at least a mile
(chronicling Colson's role in Watergate); Charles Colson: Thank God for Watergate, Life Story
Foundation website (audio file) (visited Apr. 14, 1998) <http://www.lifestory.org/
leaders.htmnl#colson>; Charles Colson, Chuck Colson's Home Page, Prison Fellowship Ministries
website (visited Apr. 14,1998) <http.//www.pfm.org/pfw/ccolson.html>; John Divito, A Christian
Perspective in a Post-Christian World: Review of Burden of Truth by Charles Colson, World
Wide Web Book Review website (visited Apr. 14, 1998) < http/www.webbookreview.com/
Colsonl.Htm>.
440. Charles Colson & Nancy Pearcy, How Courts Censor Morality, CHRISTIANITY TODAY
ONLINE EDrnON, Nov. 17, 1997 (visited Mar. 17, 1998) <http:llwww.christianity.netlct7TD/
7TD120.html> (commenting on Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990); Boerne v. City of Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578 (1987) (striking down statute requiring balanced teaching of creation and evolution theories
in public school); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (Kennedy, J.) (holding public schools
cannot obtain or instruct clergy for graduation ceremony prayers); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620
(1996) (finding law barring special civil rights based on sexual preference unconstitutional
discrimination against homosexuals)).
441. Id. at 3.
442. Id.
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and a half to pray because to quietly gather down the block is
illegal?"3
But the hearing also revealed developing fissures in the RFRA's coalition.
Alarmed at the testimony of landlord Evelyn Smith, plaintiff in Smith v.
Commission of Fair Employment and Housing,' Americans United for
Separation of Church and State complained that "[w]e are perplexed as to why
she would be called to testify.... There is no reason to believe that she or
others similarly situated would or should prevail under a new version of
PURA.1
445
Early scholarly reaction mostly reflected positions taken by the same
writers in the briefs they submitted to the Boerne Court. Michael McConnell
criticized Boerne more narrowly than the religious activists, arguing only
against the Court's limitation of congressional power under Section 5.6
Under McConnell's proposed solution, the Court should have recognized an
expanded interpretive role for Congress that would allow legislative creation
of a statutory Free Exercise right."7 John Whitehead insisted that neither
Smith nor RFRA was the answer to protecting minority faiths."
Whitehead's Smith attack followed the conventional majoritarian risk analysis.
But he also suspected putting the protection of a constitutional right in the
hands of the legislature, where politicization and legal instability will produce
more frequent showdowns between the Court and Congress, as well as
speedier changes in constitutional interpretation, and fewer individual
freedoms. 9
443. Kenny Bird, Citizens Cite Abuses in Wake of RFRA Ruling, BAPTIST STANDARD, Mar.
18, 1998, at 8.
444. 913 P.2d 909 (Cal.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2531 (1996) (reasoning that a landlord can
avoid the renting to unmarried, cohabitating persons, which may violate the landlord's moral
convictions as facilitating or condoning fornication, only by avoiding the rental business entirely).
See discussion supra note 142.
445. ld It is unclear whether Americans United was concerned that hearing Smith's
testimony wasted valuable congressional resources, or that it might become a part of the
legislative record for "RFRA II," or that it was so dangerous to their Establishment Clause
interests that Smith should be denied the forum. An additional pressure on the coalition has been
Rep. Ernest J. Istook's (R.-Okla.) Religious Freedom Amendment. The RFA would amend the
Constitution to allow public prayer and recognition of religious beliefs, heritage or traditions on
public property. The RFA also prohibits the United States or any state from requiring any person
to join in any religious activity, or to prescribe school prayers, and to discriminate against religion
or deny equal access to a benefit because of religion. RFA has split the RFRA coalition with
approximately one-third favoring RFA and two-thirds opposing it. See e.g., Kenny Bird, Panel
Oks Religious Freedom Amendment, BAPTIST STANDARD, Mar. 18, 1998, at 1, 8.
446. McConnell, Institutions, supra note 9, at 194.
447. ld at 194-95.
448. John W. Whitehead, Religious Freedom in the Nineties: Betwixt and Between Flores
and Smit, 37 WASHBuPN L.J. 105 (1997) [hereinafter Whitehead, Betwixt].
449. Id.
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Jed Rubenfeld, who actually may not have been recycling a Boerne Court-
rejected argument into a law review article:' reasoned that RFRA indeed
lacked constitutionality, but because of First Amendment
antidisestablishmentarianism, and not the reasons offered by the Court4 '
Armed with his excerpted version of the First Amendment framers' debates
and definitions for the Establishment Clause term "respecting," Rubenfeld
concluded that the First Amendment expressly prohibits Congress from
making a law interfering in any way with state regulation of religion'
RFRA was a disestablishment of religion because it attempted to expunge
state partiality toward religious majorities.453  Arguing that
antidisestablishmentarianism is essential to separation of church and state by
requiring congressional neutrality, Rubenfeld suggests that although the
Fourteenth Amendment altered federalism and selectively incorporated the Bill
of Rights, it did not alter or repeal the Establishment Clause!' Now that
both the states and the courts have rejected state religious establishments, the
remaining function of Establishment Clause antidisestablishmentarianism is to
"[prevent] Congress from supervising the nation's religious life."45
B. Does RFRA Really Violate the Fourteenth Amendment?
At one level of abstraction, the battle over Boerne resembles the sort of
hypothetical a professor might use to illustrate Hegel's dialectical reasoning.
A synthesis of the adversarial positions perhaps represents the most desirable
and constitutionally reliable outcome. But politicized, emotionally charged
showdowns between branches of government often produce extreme, zero-sum
victories. Certainly the pro-RFRA supporters as well as the fans of Justice
Brennan's substantively empowered Section 5 theory view their blowout loss
in Boerne as a disastrous example of Supreme Court extremism. Many see
a return to Smith as a return to chaotic and indifferent suppression of religious
liberty. But are there valuable nuggets among the rubble which point to a
manageable solution to the perceived crisis in Smith?
One nugget is that the Supreme Court overwhelmingly rejected a
functionally substantive reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's congressional
enforcement power. The cascade of congressional and interest group policy
arguments attempted to distract the Court from RFRA's grave peril to
450. A word search of the briefs in Boerne failed to produce any references to Rubenfeld
or to antidisestablishmentarianism. Rubenfeld's argument may, in effect, be a more sophisticated
academic version of Justice Stevens neutrality violation position. Compare with supra notes 381-
85.
451. Jed Rubenfeld, Antidisestablishmentarianism: Why RFRA Really Was Unconstitutional,
95 MICH. L. REV. 2347 (1997).
452. Id. at 2351-57.
453. Id. at 2358.
454. Id. at 2373-78.
455. Id. at 2383.
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federalism and the separation of powers by focusing on desirable results and
empty, rationalized distinctions instead of constitutional processes. But
Boerne stands along with Lopez as judicial beacons, marking the boundary
where popular, well-intentioned centralized solutions hazardously stray into
the jurisdiction thoughtfully preserved for the people acting through the
organized level of authority closest to home. The alternative would have been
to stimulate ever-expanding federal power by granting Congress virtually
unlimited ability to determine as "appropriate" the enforcement of whatever
value they could latch to their own reading of the Constitution.
Professor McConnell disagrees. He implied that Boerne lacks legitimizing
concordance with Fourteenth Amendment's briginal intent, so thus the case
was wrongly decided.4  Notwithstanding the considerable merit of
McConnell's historical approach, the Boerne Court selected the approach to
Section 5 which best preserves the traditional balance between the Congress,
the Court and the states. The Court's interpretation preserves important civil
rights cases, which allow Congress to strike preemptively against proven
forms of discrimination, but restricts Congress from becoming a sitting
constitutional convention with virtually unlimited power. The Court preserves
this fragile balance by testing enforcement legislation for appropriateness.
McConnell has attacked the Court's standard for limiting "appropriate"
enforcement under Section 5. He compared the congruence and
proportionality standard to the heightened means-ends scrutiny in Lopez, and
was surprised that no justice dissented on the Court's Section 5 holding which
he believes "necessarily transfers essentially political judgments from the
legislature to the courts."' Assuming McConnell's conclusion arguendo, the
result of shifting political judgments is not reallocating decisional power from
"the legislature to the courts" but from the Congress to the states. Nothing in
Smith or Boerne prevents the states from readjusting the free exercise baseline
beyond what the Court found constitutionally required. Ohio Solicitor Jeffery
Sutton's oral argument in Boerne assumed that the states will act responsibly
to protect religious minorities:
[T]he unanimity behind RFRA strikes me as a wonderful
opportunity from a federalist perspective. [I] suggest that there
will be fifty-one RFRAs when all is said and done. The states
aren't going to stand idle. My boss is not going to stand idle after
the argument I'm making today, if it prevails, I promise you that.
Thbe states are - they're doing a great job when it comes to Free
Exercise Clause issues, so . . . I don't think there should be a
concern about underprotection s8
456. McConnell, Institutions, supra note 9, at 195.
457. Id. at 166.
458. Transcript of Oral Argument at *25-*26, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 87109.
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Accordingly, the "mini-RFRA" option has been often discussed and is moving
forward in several states 5 While virtually all religious activists prefer a
role for the judiciary in crafting religious exceptions, and many fear
fragmented, uneven protection under the "mini-RFRA" approach, these result-
oriented policy arguments should not alter the constitutional analysis of
Section 5 power. The danger is that recognizing quasi-substantive power
might minimize the effects of Smith, but it also would have opened the door
for future congressional action in other areas without a unequivocal limit.
Section 5 limits congressional power to "appropriate legislation."' The
plain meaning of this provision either invites judicial review, or is merely an
aspirational statement meant to encourage a self-policing Congress from
inappropriately enforcing Section I. ' Regardless of what might be inferred
from the fragmentary statements of individual legislators about legislative
intent, as a practical matter, Congress would be hard pressed to substantively
review its own enforcement legislation for appropriateness. Section 5
establishes no unique structure to do so. Thus in-Congress review would
ultimately rely on majority votes. Presumably the same Congress which
would achieve a majority to pass enforcement legislation would vote that it
is "appropriate." Thus if the statement was limited to congressional
application, it foreshadows no real, independent scrutiny of appropriateness.
But in order for a meaningfully answer to the "appropriateness" question, the
courts must independently review enforcement legislation at a level of. ends-
means scrutiny greater than rationality. This is a manageable standard.
The Boerne Court's holding also recognizes that the political branch of
government lacks the structural ability and institutional discipline to
dispassionately interpret the Constitution. In contrast to the Court's core
beliefs on who should have the final word about what the Constitution means,
McConnell argued that of the three options for congressional power under
Section 5, substantive, remedial and interpretive, the Boerne court mistakenly
limited Congress to remedial power, conflicting with the legislative intent
behind the Fourteenth Amendment.' Maintaining that the Court distorted
459. See e.g. Whitehead, Betwixt, supra note 448, at 111 nn.21-28; Melissa Rogers, Church-
State Intersection: July 1997, Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs website (visited Mar. 17,
1998) <http.//www.erols.combjcpa./Legal%20/csijl97.html> [hereinafter Rogers, Church-State
Intersection]; Latest RFRA Efforts at the State Level, Christian Legal Society website (visited
Mar. 17, 1998) <http://www.clsnet.con/flores> (reporting that Connecticut and Rhode Island
already have statutes and that action is pending or in the formulation stage in New York,
Michigan, California, Ohio, Texas, Maryland, and Virginia).
460. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
461. Logically it could not have any other meaning. Only the three branches of federal
government could be candidates for reviewing the appropriateness of enforcement legislation.
Presumably it was not intended to inform the political judgment of the President, who is
guaranteed an unfettered review of all congressional acts under Article One, Section Seven,
Clause Three.
462. McConnell, Institutions, supra note 9, at 175-81.
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the legislative history, and reasoning that the Republican-controlled,
reconstruction-era Congress would not have entrusted exclusive protection for
the newly recognized civil rights of African Americans to the Dred Scott
Court,' McConnell rejected the Court's conclusion that Congress cannot
independently define unconstitutional state acts. He posited that the
Fourteenth Amendment expanded the power delegated to Congress,
incorporating an independent interpretive role for the federal legislature.'
But. at best, McConnell's conclusions about legislative intent are
inconclusively supported by only the fragmentary statements of individual
legislators. Furthermore, the historical record shows that the Reconstruction
Congress was far from a self-restraining, dispassionate deliberative body
concerned with protecting and preserving the Constitution. Our nation's first
impeachment crisis was predicated in a face off between this same Congress
and President Andrew Johnson over the scope of congressional power"
President Johnson fired Secretary of War Edward M. Stanton to provoke a
confrontation over the Tenure of Office Act of 1867, which banned the
President from dismissing officials without the consent of the Senate. In a
political "showdown caused by emotion more than by practical consideration,"
the Senate failed by one vote to eject Johnson." Professor Garraty
concluded that "[h]ad he been forced from office on such flimsy grounds, the
independence of the executive might have been permanently weakened [and]
the legislative branch would have become supreme."'  Thus, some in this
self-aggrandizing group of legislators probably did likewise seek to
circumvent the Supreme Court's functional jurisdiction. But their motives and
lack of constitutional restraint undermine reliance upon their conclusions.
Radical reconstruction of the Separation of Powers doctrine ought to rest on
more than isolated sentiments of self-interested, vocal congressmen. For the
expansive interpretive thesis to be true, the ratifying states would have had to
knowingly and voluntarily acquiesced to yielding this expanded power to
Congress. This evidence has yet to be produced. Finally, the Court correctly
observed that throughout the post-reconstruction history of the reconstruction
amendments, Congress has limited its "appropriate enforcement" actions to
circumstances of specific, demonstrated threats to interests protected by the
amendments.'
A modem "rediscovery" of this alleged, but unused congressional power
to interpret the Constitution would produce results virtually impossible to
463. Id. at 181.
464. Id. at 181-83.
465. id. at 194.
466. See GARRATY, supra note 41, at 400-01.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 400.
469. See supra notes 359-65.
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restrain with any reasonable principle. Certainly, an examination of modem
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, with its focus on implied fundamental
rights and substantive due process, powerfully suggests that the Court has
found self-restraint difficult.470 McConnell attempted to contain this mostly
dormant, until recently unearthed, congressional power by excluding Congress
from the seemingly boundless domain of substantive due process. He
concluded that legislative intent limits independent congressional
interpretations to express constitutional provisions, like the First
Amendment.'" The problem is that this merely substitutes an implied
limitation of "appropriate" enforcement power for the Court's more traditional
test. If Congress can interpret for itself the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment's protection as applied to expressed constitutional rights, it is only
a small, uncontrolled, independent rationalization away from discovering it
can protect penumbral rights ostensibly derived from combinations of
expressed rights.
For example, Tepker suggested that the grand unifying solution to the
Smith problem, as well as virtually all other issues surrounding the religion
clauses, would be to discover a right to religious privacy. ' He justified
reading beyond the text by arguing in part:
The words of the First Amendment were - and are - ambiguous.
[A] simple, sensible interpretation of Congress' choice of language
for the religion clauses emphasizes style, not substance. Congress
approached the subject in a somewhat hasty and absent-minded
manner. [r]o see the two clauses as separate, balanced, competing
or carefully worked out prohibitions designed to meet different
eventualities would be to read into the minds of the actors far more
than was there... !'
So to appropriately enforce the founding fathers abstract, unrecorded
conception of religious liberty, Tepker argued that the Court must go beyond
the literal language of the religion clauses and into the uncontrolled morass
of privacy. Pragmatically, Tepker perhaps wanted to incorporate free exercise
cases into the court-fabricated general, implied right to privacy because of
privacy's three decade-long winning streak in the high Court. But Tepker
assumed that the courts, not Congress would be "appropriately" enforcing this
implied fundamental right.
470. See e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 261-65 (1990) (criticizing the
implied fundamental right of privacy decisions flowing out of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 428 (1972), as being results-driven, rather than
respectful of constitutional process).
471. McConnell, Institutions, supra note 9, at 184-85.
472. See Tepker, Hallucinations, supra note 32, at 44-54.
473. Id. at 47-48 (citations omitted).
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Yet if Congress can determine what rights are included in the Fourteenth
Amendment's scope, arbitrarily limiting them to the "hasty" "absent-minded"
and "ambiguous" expressed rights is unsatisfying, formalistic and would be
probably shortlived. Robert Bork observed that even celebrated Lochner474
opponent Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes was actually seduced by the siren
song of substantive due process, quoting as evidence a forgotten portion of
Holmes' Lochner dissent:
X think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is
perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a
dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair
man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would
inringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by
the traditions of our people and our laws. So Holmes, after all,
did accept substantive due process, he merely disagreed with
]Peckham and the majority about which principles were
fundamental. [T]here was no Justice on the Court who was not
prepared to substitute his opinions for those of elected
representatives at some point. The difference was merely about
when that point was reached.475
But to accept the arbitrary expressed rights stop sign offered by McConnell,
Congress would be forced to interpret the term "liberty" much more narrowly
than the Court already has. It is irrational relativism to assume that Congress
intended to grant itself some interpretive power, but also understood that with
the same language it was simultaneously granting the Court carte blanche to
fully determine the scope of liberty. Logically, either the Congress can or
cannot make a definitive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
interpretive theory attempts to have it both ways. But once Congress has
interpretive power of our organic document that the courts are bound to
respect, they will likely feel attracted to substantive due process as a
reasonable byproduct of their new role. And the Court would have difficulty
reigning this interpretation in without revisiting the source of their own forays
into Lochnerizing. As a result, federalism would cease to exist as a
meaningful limitation on Congress under the interpretive scheme. Congress
would then be substituting its opinion for those of the local elected
representatives, much like the judiciary has in its quest for implied,
fundamental rights.
The proponents of expanded congressional power attempt to deflect such
criticism by suggesting one-way directional limitations on the interpretive
power. Arguing yet another disguised version of the Ratchet theory for
474. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (recognizing freedom of contract as an
implied fundamental right applied against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment).
475. BoRK, supra note 470, at 45-46.
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judicial deference,476 McConnell suggested that the Court ought to defer to
"permissible" or "reasonably plausible" congressional interpretations of the
Constitution, much as it does under the Chevron doctrine in administrative
law.4 Additionally, McConnell insisted that, unlike in Lopez, Congress
seriously considered the constitutional impact of RFRA, and should have been
rewarded for their efforts as a matter of comity by applying the presumption
of constitutionality to the statute.47 These theories gut the Court of any basis
for substantive oversight of congressional interpretations. If Congress could
prove that its listing of protected rights was rational, in other words, not
insane, and that they had considered the constitutional implications of their
choice, the Court would be hamstrung from overruling them. Thus the
judiciary's function would be reduced to review of the process by which
Congress arrived at its interpretation. Absent considerations of federalism, this
might be acceptable. But given both the Court's own substantive due process
demonstrations of "permissible" or "reasonably plausible" interpretations of
the Constitution, the states would probably not be able to rely on the Court
for protection from Congress. The Boerne Court spared itself from having to
make these unsettling choices by correctly limiting Congress to its traditional
function.
C. The Return of Smith
1. General Effects
The resurrection of Smith revives a number of interpretive issues for the
Court. Most importantly, the Court at some point will need to explain the
doctrinal bases and limits of the facially neutral law rule. For example, at one
level of abstraction, Reynolds4& ' and Lukumi' become alarmingly similar.
Both cases involved somewhat oppressed religious minorities attempting to
reintroduce an unpopular practice as an essential tenet of their faith. Both
polygamy and animal sacrifice were common within historic religious
cultures. And both groups could argue disparate impact if not disparate
treatment resulting from the statutory scheme. But the final results of the two
cases are centuries apart in both time and result. Professor Laycock, arguing
for the Archbishop at the Supreme Court, suggested his solution to the
problem under RFRA:
QUESTION: Mr. Laycock, do you think [RFRA] overturns
Reynolds?
476. See supra notes 206-11.
477. McConnell, Institutions, supra note 9, at 184 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc v. National
Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
478. Id. at 186-87.
479. See supra notes 33-52.
480. See supra notes 112-29.
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MR. LAYCOCK: Do I think it overturns Reynolds?
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. LAYCOCK: No, I don't think it overturns Reynolds, but
the - that's a compelling interest question. That's a question
whether protecting women is - and the other harms of
polygamous marriage would be a compelling interest.
QUESTION: Well, of course, Reynolds didn't reason on that
basis. I mean, there wasn't any compelling interest standard at the
time of Reynolds.
MR. LAYCOCK: You would write a different opinion than
you wrote in Reynolds, but it's not at all clear the result would be
any different than in Reynolds, but that would be up to this
Court. '
But with the death of RFRA, at least as applied to the states, the Court would
be forced to resolve a-new polygamy case by either a blind incantation of
Reynolds, or finding a hybrid right to trigger Sherbert-Yoder's compelling
interest test.
Unfortunately, Justice Scalia's crabbed interpretation of licentiousness,
ignoring its usus loquendi known to the drafters,4 caused the Court to miss
a compromise solution to the doctrinal inadequacies of the Smith rule. This
concept is the key element which prevents the legislature from squelching
legitimate religious exercise, but limits religious freedom from degenerating
into antinomianism. Certainly, the framers did not conceive of religious
liberty as an unlimited concept, notwithstanding their often expansive rhetoric.
Revival of many historic religious practices would have repulsed the early
free exercise advocates. For example, it would be difficult to argue that the
drafters' and ratifiers' freedom of conscience conceptions included protection
for human sacrifice as was practiced by the Aztecs and Mayans in their pre-
Columbian era religions. The founding fathers also undoubted were aware
that temple prostitution flourished in the ancient near East and in pre-Christian
Greece under the color of religion.4u It is doubtful that the founders, heavily
influenced by Puritan morality, would have tolerated a religious exception to
their strict laws against prostitution.
481. Transcript of Oral Argument at *36-*37, Boerne (No. 95-2074), 1997 WL 87109.
482. See supra note 418.
483. See ALFONSO CASO, THE AzTECs: PEOPLE OF THE SUN 73-74 (Lowell Dunham trans.,
1958) (describing Aztec religious human sacrifice and cannibalism); J. ERIC S. THOMPSON, THE
RISE AND FALL OF MAYA CIVILZATON 278-85 (2d ed. 1966)(citing a chilling first-hand account
of a ritual killing). Thompson observed that "[h]uman sacrifice is shocking, but one can
appreciate that it is logical if he accepts the premise that the gods need human blood to give them
strength to perform their tasks, and its corollary that it is the duty of a devout people to provide
it." Id at 283.
484. See JOHN F. DECKER, PROSTITUTION: REGULATION AND CONTROL 30-36 (1979).
485. U. at 58. Decker argues, however, that the supply of prostitutes was limited by a
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However, it is unreasonable to overlay modem conceptions of compelling
interest balancing on the founders' intent. Yet the inclusion of the
licentiousness concept in many of the state-level religion clauses' indicates
that the founders expected the government to make qualitative moral
judgments about fringe religious practices. Licentiousness was a familiar
theological term of art to the colonial Christian. For example the New
Testament Greek word aselgeia is often translated as licentiousness or
debauchery.4" Although the King James translation of the Bible used the
synonym lasciviousness, licentiousness was used interchangeably to describe
the same misconduct. For example, Jonathan Edwards, a central figure in the
Great Awakening and arguably America's most important early theologian,
made a typical application of the term when he summarized the moral
conditions prevalent in his town before the outbreak of revival:
Licentiousness for some years greatly prevailed among the youth
of the town; there were many of them very much addicted to
night walking and frequenting the tavern, and lewd practices
wherein some by their example exceedingly corrupted others. It
was their manner to get together in assemblies of both sexes for
mirth and jollity, which they called frolics; and they would often
spend the greater part of the night in them, without regard to
order in the families they belonged to: indeed family government
did to much fail in the town.48
Furthermore, the licentiousness concept was familiar in pre-existing religious
toleration formulations of which the drafters would have been aware. In 1653,
Lord Protector Oliver Cromwell was limited by the Instrument of
Government, which included a modest, but anti-Catholic, toleration restriction:
That such as profess faith in God by Jesus Christ (though
differing in judgment from the doctrine, worship, or discipline
publicly held forth) shall not be restrained from, but shall be
protected in, the profession of faith and exercise of their religion,
so as they abuse not this liberty to the civil injury of others and
to the actual disturbance of the public peace on their parts:
shortage of women, and is a better explanation for the relative absence of prostitution in early
American history. Id. at 58-62.
486. See supra notes 405-08.
487. See THEOLOGICAL DICTIONARY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT, supra note 140, at 83
(comparing the use of aselgeia in 2 Peter2:7 (referring to Sodom and Gomorrah), Ephesians 4:19
(referring to the pagan world), and Galatians 5:19, Romans 13:13, 2 Corinthians 12:21, and 2
Peter 2:2, 18 (referring to sexual excess)).
488. See I MYRON A. MARTY & H. THEODORE FINKELSTON, RETRACING OUR STEPS:
STUDIES IN DOCUMENTS FROM THE AMERICAN PAST 23 (1972).
489. WILLIAM WARREN SwEET, THE STORY OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 129 (1973) (quoting
Jonathan Edwards).
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provided this liberty be not extended to popery or prelacy, nor to
such as, under the profession of Christ, hold forth and practise
licentiousness.4
Thus unlike Scalia's redundant treatment of licentiousness as an archaic
alternative way to say breach of the peace, licentiousness referred to practices
adjudged too immoral for protection under a religious objection tb facially
neutral law of general applicability. Under this reading of the early state
religion clauses,49 the free exercise of religion was only limited by
disruptive activity and immorality. Although zoning was a century-and-a-half
away from becoming a function of local government, it is unlikely that the
founders would have seen such a minor, morally neutral exercise of the police
power as falling within the territory proscribed from religious free exercise.
But temple prostitution and polygamy would certainly be immoral practices
falling outside of the freedom of religious conscience. This formulation lacks
the anti-government bias of the rigorously applied compelling interest
balancing test. However, some commentators argue that the Court never
rigorously applied so-called strict scrutiny to free exercise cases before
Smith!' This view of religious free exercise also allows the Court to avoid
subjective inquiries into the importance, sincerity or centrality of a particular
religious practice. The relevant inquiries would be whether the practice in
question would have offended the objective moral sensibilities of the framers
or whether it disrupts the community. Thus reasonable time, place and
manner restrictions, such as are generally accepted under freedom of
expression doctrine, would be sustainable and the Free Exercise Clause would
not become a shelter for every objection to every neutral regulation of
personal conduct. But the Court would also return to a higher scrutiny of
morally neutral regulations, giving the benefit of the doubt to religious
objectors.
2. Effects on Indian Free Exercise
Even after Boerne, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
Amendments (AIRFA) continue to protect the right of American Indians to
ingest peyote during religious ceremonies. This federal protection against
state overreaching is valid under the Trust Doctrine." The courts have
recognized this unique political status in barring similar drug law exemption
claims by non-Indians.495 On the peyote issue, the Court's wrecking of
490. Selectionsfrom the Instrument of Government, 1653, in DOCUMENTS OF THE CHRISTIAN
CHURCH 291 (Henry Bettenson ed., 2d ed. 1963).
491. See supra notes 405-08.
492. See e.g. Tepker, Hallucinations, supra note 32, at 22.
493. See supra notes 102-11.
494. See generally FELIx S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 220-28 (Rennard
Strickland et al. eds., 1982).
495. See, e.g., Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991)
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RFRA at most disadvantages some Native American prisoners. A shortcoming
of AIFRA, however, is that it fails to protect other central elements of Indian
religious practices, such as sweat lodge ceremonies and the public land use
problem encountered in Lyng.4D Furthermore, it places Indian religious free
exercise on a separate track of statutory protection, rather than the more
secure First Amendment basis. While AIFRA affords better protection for a
few non-majoritarian religious practices than Smith, it is at best an incomplete
and imperfect solution to a problem affecting more than just Native
Americans. Tribal claimants may be less able than their more mainstream
counterparts to navigate a local, legislative exception for misunderstood
religious practices because of their relative lack of lobbying power. Conflicts
over tribal sovereignty may also make local politicians less receptive to any
Indian concerns, inhibiting local efforts to gain accommodation. Jurisdictional
confusion and misunderstandings about federal protection may cause some
governments to ignore calls for exemptions until an actual case presents itself.
Therefore, tribal claimants may have even a steeper journey toward local
accommodation than their similarly situated non-Indian counterparts.
V. Conclusion
In Boerne, the Court decided that local and state governments, not the
Congress or the judiciary should decide when to grant religious exceptions to
facially neutral laws. To many observers, the Court missed an opportunity to
correct an unfortunate detour away from strong protection for religious
minorities. Others, such as Justice Scalia see the Court's current path as
consistent with the founding fathers' vision for religious freedom as well as
preventing religion-based anarchy. The wisdom of the Court's choice will be
debated for some time to come. And RFRA, of course is not dead as applied
to the federal government.49 But one important doctrinal concept was
reinforced by the Boerne Court: that the Court alone makes the substantive
determinations about the scope of the Reconstruction Amendments. The Court
was not fooled by disclaiming language meant to sugar-coat a functional
attempt to force a rejected constitutional test on the judiciary. As Justice
(reviewed in John Thomas Bannon, Jr., The Legality of the Religious Use of Peyote by the Native
American Church: A Commentary on the Free Exercise, Equal Protection, and Establishment
Issues Raised by the Peyote Way Church of God Case, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 475 (1998));
Kansas v. McBride, 955 P.2d 133 (Kan. App. 1998) (rejecting AIRFA claim of Rastafarian
Church members to ingest marijuana).
496. For a description of the sweat lodge ceremony and its historic importance to traditional
Indian religious observance, see Sweat Lodge Ceremony, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIVE
AMERICAN RELIGIONS 287 (Arlene Hirschfelder & Paulette Molin eds., 1992).
497. See supra notes 94-101.
498. For example a continuing controversy involves RFRA's impact on the Bankruptcy Code.
See, e.g., Christians v. Crystal Evangelical Free Church, 82 F.3d 1407, vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2502
(1997); In re Hodge, 200 B.R. 884 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1996).
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Marshall proclaimed during the infancy of the republic, it is the Cotrt's duty
to say what the law is.4w
Discussions of how to "fix" the Smith problem now must consider Boerne's
limitation of congressional enforcement power to remedial applications.
Congress may attempt to address the problem by specific piecemeal
legislaiion aimed at particularly egregious infringements of facially neutral,
generally applied statutes on minority religious practice. Some commentators
have suggested bribing the states with contingent federal grants or using the
Commerce Clause as authority for a new, revised RFRA.' Activists have
also discussed a constitutional amendment, but this method has failed to
sustain RFRA's broad political coalition."1 And many states will take further
steps to protect religious minorities. But unless and until the Court revisits the
Smith decision, the primary protector of the people's free exercise rights
against governmental intrusions under facially neutral laws of general
applicability will be the people themselves operating through their local
political processes. And many disputes will undoubtedly be resolved as
Archbishop Flores' fight against the zoning law ultimately was in Boerne,
Tex.: by reasonable people making sound, local accommodations for religious
practices.
499. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
500. See e.g. Whitehead, Betwixt, supra note 448, at I11 nn.21-28; Rogers, Church-State
Intersection, supra note 459; Latest RFRA Efforts at the State Level, Christian Legal Society
website (visited Mar. 17, 1998) <http.//www.clsnet.com/flores>.
501. See e.g. Whitehead, Betwixt, supra note 448, at 111 nn.21-28; Rogers, Church-State
Intersection, supra note 459.
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